Digital Repression During the Three Phases of the Sham Election
- Myanmar Internet Project
- 2 days ago
- 7 min read
Introduction
The Myanmar Internet Project (MIP) and Spring Revolution Security (SRS) monitored digital repression, online surveillance, and the weaponization of information during the three phases of the 2025 sham election held by the military junta. In conducting this monitoring, methodologies such as digital platform observation, data collection from independent news media, and gathering ground-level data through regional networks were utilized.
This report compiles and presents the monitoring results of the digital repression conditions observed throughout the three phases of the 2025 sham election.
1. Internet Shutdown and Digital Repression During the Sham Election Period
To monitor and verify on ground communication disruptions and internet shutdown situations, MIP coordinated with on ground networks and acquired data from independent media for real-time monitoring during the sham election.
(1.1) Internet and Communication Outages
Prior to and during the sham election, there were instances of slowed internet connections, difficulty accessing telephone lines, and the use of signal jammers by the Military Council for security purposes.
(1.1.1) Communication Outages leading up to the sham Election
Before the election period, starting from 1 November, Myanmar experienced slow and disrupted internet connections nationwide for the reason that a submarine cable fault occurred at the Internet Gateway (IGW) provider.
Although the Ministry of Transportation and Communications announced that internet connections would be restored to normal by the end of December, they remained slow and had not returned to normal by the completion of the first phase of the sham election.
(1.1.2) Communication Disruption During the Sham Election Periods
According to reports from the local networks, on 28 December, Wi-Fi connections were disrupted in Kyangin Township, Ayarwaddy Region, while Myeik township in Tanintharyi Region and Meikhtila Township in Mandalay Region were experiencing unstable communication conditions. On 27 and 28 December, mobile phone connections were disrupted in Sistwe, Rakhin State.
Mon News Agency reported that between the first and second phase of the election, Belin and Kyaikto townships in Mon State; Kyainseikgyi, Kawkareik, Hpapun and Hlaing Bwe townships in Kayin State; Yebyu, east parts of Dawei, Launglon, Myeik district, and Kyunsu Townships in Tanintharyi Region experienced not only airstrikes but also internet shutdowns. Moreover, between the first and second phases of the election, mobile phone connections were shut down in Katha following the fighting. On 22 January, a junta jet bombed a crowd preparing for a wedding in Tat Kone Village, Aunglan, Magway Region. Mizzima media outlet reported that Internet connections have been shut down in the area. As the time for holding the third phase of the election approached, internet connections were slowed to the point of being unusable in townships in southern Shan State.
(1.1.3) Military’s use of Jammers during the Sham Election Periods
Local Networks informed MIP that jammers were installed and used at the Kamyawkin Bridge checkpoint located in Dawei, and were also used at polling stations set up in schools in Shin Mote Hti and Kanaingdar villages in Dawei, Tanintharyi Region. MPA New Agency reported that due to drone and heavy weapon threats, the State Security and Peace Commission instructed authorities to install the jammers at the polling stations in Mon State, and to arrest the suspect individuals.
Local Networks confirmed MIP that jammers were installed and used in some parts of Kuaukpadaung and Poppa.
(1.2) Myanmar Electronic Voting Machine(MEVM) technical issues and malfunctions reported during the Sham Election Periods
The State Security and Peace Commission changed and used the voting machine named MEVM in the election it organized in order to get accurate results. Nevertheless, during the first phase of the election period, voting machine malfunctions occurred at the polling stations located in Sittwe, Hinthada, Yangon and Dawei. CJ Platform reported that 22 voting machines, used in 21 polling stations in Bago Region, experienced malfunctions.
A DVB News stated that voting machine malfunctions happened in the Dawei, Tanintharyi Region, voters were only able to press the bottom for the USDP party. In voting machine malfunctions experienced in the Sittwe, Rakhine State, the printed pages confirming the voters’ selections did not display properly.
During the second phase of election, the voting machine malfunctions happened Wakema township in Ayarwaddy Region, Mawkmai in Shan State, Kungyangon and Kawhmu townships in Yangon Region. U Kyaw Kyaw Htwe, a candidate for the People Party (PP) in Kawhmu Township, said “In Kawhmu, at one polling station, when the voting machine button was pressed 12 times, six times it registered only one major party. In Kungyangon, the People’s Party voting machine button was broken. They only said the machine was malfunctioning after someone noticed it and spoke up.”
Moreover, Shan News media outlet reported that in the third phrase, voting machine malfunctions also were experienced in some polling stations in Nyaung Shwe, Shan State.
Lt. Gen. Tun Tun Naung, who also serves as the Chair of the Central Committee for Election Period Security, Minister of Home Affair, has admitted that the voting machines have malfunctioned.
(1.3) Media Freedom Situation
During the election period, there were also incidents of interference with media freedom.Media outlets also stated that they were not able to report freely during the election. Members of Pyusawhti, military back, hindered the journalists who officially went to report at polling stations in Hlaingthaya in the third phase.
(1.4) Persecution of Political Dissents citing “The law on the Protection of Multiparty Democratic Elections from Obstruction, Disruption and Destruction”
The State Security and Peace Commission enacted “the law on the Protection of Multiparty Democratic Elections from Obstruction, Disruption and Destruction” to suppress the opponents of the sham election.
The State Security and Peace Commission announced that 324 men and 80 women - 404 individuals in total - have been taken action under this law. It is also using that law to arrest people for online criticism. According to the data which was collected by Myanmar Internet Project (MIP), at least (38) individuals (25 men and 13 women) were detained under this law due to their online activities. In Mayangone Village, Thaton Township, Mon State, two women who brought their mobile phones to the polling station also were arrested under this law.
2. Weaponization of Information
Across all three phases of the 2025 sham election, no disinformation campaigns targeting the voting processes or the Union Election Commission were observed. Instead, the social media pages of military commission supporters and nationalists were heavily filled with content such as welcoming and supporting the election, testimonies from party supporters at campaign rallies, incitements to vote, and portrayals of polling stations crowded with voters.
(2.1) Conflict Related News during the Sham Election Period
A series of bomb blasts and shootings across Tamu, Lewe, Pyay, Dawei, Mandalay, Monywa, and Myawaddy on the night of December 27 became the primary focus of public discussion by the following morning.
On January 11, artillery fire broke out at the General Administration Department (GAD) office and the Myoma Police Station in Chaung-U Town, Sagaing Region. On the same day, a drone bomb attack targeted the GAD office in Htantabin Township, Bago Region, resulting in the suspension of voting and the closure of all polling stations.
Media reports indicate that intense fighting has broken out in Hpakant Township, Kachin State, as revolutionary allied forces launched heavy artillery attacks on areas surrounding polling stations during the third phase of elections on January 25. The military has reportedly responded with counterattacks, leading to fierce clashes between both sides.
(2.2) Coercive Voting and Undue Abuse of Authority Reported
During the first phase of the election on December 28, reports emerged that local authorities in townships including Bogale, Thaketa, Monywa, Lashio, and Kyauktada informed residents that voting was mandatory. Authorities reportedly warned that legal action would be taken against those who failed to cast their ballots.
During the second phase of the election on January 11, reports surfaced that ward and village authorities across several townships including Minhla, Ye, Kawhmu, and Shwepyithar, informed residents that voting was compulsory. Officials reportedly warned that those who failed to participate would face legal action.
During the third phase of the election on January 25, reports emerged that ward and village authorities in several townships including Ingapu, Yegyi, Mingala Taungnyunt, Hpa-an, Mahlaing, and Patheingyi informed residents that voting was compulsory. Officials reportedly warned that those who failed to participate would face legal action.
3. Surveillance
(3.1) PSMS and Biometric Data Abuse is Feared and Expanding
Threat of PSMS was widely reported around election period on 26-November, 25-December, 26-December, 26-December and 27-December.
Although there were a lot of restrictions such as checkpoints, scrutiny of mobile devices and screening of personnel on the ground through the infamous PSMS system (Person Scrutinizing and Monitoring System) and others, we do not observe any major escalations in terms of technologically facilitated arrests or crackdowns especially during three dates of the election. However, we identified pattern indicating expansion of PSMS’s system’s capability (through the announcement of PSMS upgrade on November) and scalability (directive(s) of guest list registration to be triaged with PSMS system in Yangon on December 22nd and on September and report about the possible integration of PSMS with facial recognition system).
Additionally, we assess that the election committee may also be digitizing the voter data through what we assume as Microsoft Excel. Lastly the central bank also announced that they are preparing to link e-ID and SIM-Registration data to monitor and surveil the money transfer of individuals. Following news also highlighted monitoring and seizure of multiple hundi services. Implying grounds for further risks and threats.
(3.2) Censorship and Surveillance Continued
The overall VPN and circumvention situations remained largely stable. However, observations during the election period show that certain circumvention technologies, particularly Outline servers deployed through partnerships with Engaged Media, were subject to more frequent and proactive blocking on election days. We access this as a proactive monitoring and targeted blocking of circumvention solutions during a high risk event.
Conclusion
In all three phases of the 2025 sham election, it was observed that internet speeds were throttled, phone communications were difficult, and signal jammers were deployed in areas where the military junta prioritized security. During the months of December and January—the core period of this sham election—military conflicts persisted, and internet shutdowns were utilized to facilitate aerial bombardments.
Regarding the use of voting machines, there were reports of mechanical failures, breakdowns, and several controversial technical issues. On polling days, restrictions were also placed on those reporting from polling stations. In terms of election-related information, while the spread of "fake news" was relatively low, there was a high volume of content promoting voter turnout, campaigning, and portrayals of polling stations as being crowded with voters.
In terms of surveillance, there was widespread fear of being monitored and arrested via PSMS (Person Scrutinizing and Monitoring System) for participating in the election; however, no specific instances of arrests or legal actions resulting from this were recorded.
Recommended Citation Style - Myanmar Internet Project(2026, January 29),
Digital Repression During the Three Phases of the Sham Election,
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