2025 Yearly Report on Digital Repression in Myanmar
- Myanmar Internet Project
- 4 hours ago
- 13 min read
(1) Introduction
The 2021 coup in Myanmar has severely deteriorated the state of Internet freedom in Myanmar. Freedom House’s 2025 Freedom On the Net report ranks Myanmar alongside China - this is consistent with their reportage back from 2024.
During 2025, patterns of crackdown on basic rights online such as freedom of expression, access to information and rights to privacy in addition to internet shutdown situations continued. Additionally, the junta enacted laws and regulations to suppress digital rights and internet freedom.
We have compiled and analyzed digital rights violations during the year 2025 in this report.
(2) Methodology
We compiled our data through reporting from independent and ethnic media, reliable and reputable local telegram channels, human rights and digital rights watchdog organizations and junta affiliated media throughout 2025.
Whereas we also try to verify incidents and events with locals through vetted partners, we cite more than one source in situations where reaching out to the local populace is not favorable due to security concerns.
(3) Connectivity and Internet Shutdowns in 2025
Since the military coup in 2021, parts and the whole of Myanmar has been frequently subjected to various types of internet shutdowns. During 2025, we faced 105 instances of internet shutdown across 73 townships in 14 states and regions.
MIP documented shutdown of internet and/or mobile service in (2) townships in Kachin, (1) township in Karenni, (4) township in Kayin, (9) townships in Chin,(1) township in Rakhine, and (5) townships Shan States respectively in 2025
In terms of regions documented shutdown of internet and/or mobile service of (9) townships in Ayeyarwaddy, (6) township in Bago, (9) township in Magway, (6) townships in Mandalay,(11) township in Tanintharyi, and (5) townships Yangon respectively throughout 2025.
Analyzing the internet shutdown pattern, we note that Ayeyarwady where recent clashes from Rakhine has been steadily spreading out to has been most frequently subjected to connectivity disruptions.
Regarding frequency, active conflict areas such as Kachin, Karenni, and Rakhine have faced only a few internet shutdowns. However, almost all of Karenni has been disconnected since 2023, with the exception of its capital, Loikaw, and its vicinity. Almost all parts of Rakhine and Chin have been similarly cut off from the internet since 2024. During the junta leader, Min Aung Hlaing’s visit to Yangon to commemorate the 2025 Martyr Day, multiple reports indicated mobile and internet service disruptions due to use of Jammer devices. His visit to Mandalay for the Centennial celebration of Mandalay University similarly accompanied service disruptions in Mandalay. His Thanlyin visit also brought service blackouts to the local populace. North Okklapa and Mingalardon townships in Yangon also suffered partial service disruptions during the junta second in command’s, Soe Win, visit to the graduation ceremony of military medical personnel.
Magway, Sagaing, Tanintharyi - each of these areas were subjected to more than 10 instances of internet and service shutdown within 2025.
Analyzing types of 105 instances of internet shutdown during 2025, we documented that 47.6 % of the shutdown instances were to impose further restriction of mobile service termination in areas with Internet shutdown already in place. Internet connectivity shutdown attributed 15.2% while 39.1 % of them resulted in total internet and mobile network termination for local populace. Our report “Disconnected and Targeted” identified that of 645 airstrikes that Junta ordered, the resulting 96.87% of the casualties and 96.15% of the wounded were in internet shutdown areas.
Internet Society’s Pulse NetLoss Calculator also estimates a loss of nearly 500 million USD resulting from the internet shutdown after the 2021 military coup.
The internet shutdown situation in Myanmar has been attributed to loss of life, economic recession and livelihood of the populace. Additionally, rise of cyber crime and subsequent block of Starlink connectivity further restricted civilian’s access to critical information and livelihood.
(4) Internet Restrictions Imposed by Armed Groups
Internet access restrictions are not exclusive to the military junta, the revolutionary forces and ethnic armed groups were also responsible for imposing access restrictions to the populace. We documented 13 instances of internet access (like Starlink) restrictions imposed by the pro-revolution armed groups in 2025.
Data | Organization | Region/State | Area | Reason |
3, January | Rakhine | AA Controlled area | Airstrike threat | |
28, January | Shan | Kyaukme | Airstrike threat | |
5, February | Shan | Thibaw | Unverify | |
4, March | Myaing (PakaFa) | Magway | Myaning | Airstrike threat |
1, May | Kayinni | Mawchi | informant | |
13, May | Kayinni | Hpasawng | Airstrike threat & informant | |
11, July | Rakhine | AA Controlled area | Airstrike threat | |
27, August | Rakhine | AA Controlled area | Airstrike threat | |
16, September | Sagaing | Banmauk | Local security | |
16, September | Sagaing | Kani | military/security concerns | |
3, November | Shan | Namtu | Unverify | |
23, November | Shan | Mogoke | military/security concerns | |
22, December | Sagaing | Indaw | military/security concerns |
Internet access restrictions imposed
by the revolutionary forces and ethnic armed groups along with the reasons cited
During 2025, National Unity Government (NUG) led forces and armed forces under their command, Arakan Army (AA), Ta'ang National Liberation Army (TNLA), District Administration Committee of Lopwakho(လိုပွာခို) and White Star Force of Karenni state imposed internet access restrictions.
These restrictions affected AA controlled areas in Rakhine state, Kyauk Mae, Thipaw, Namtu, Moegoke towns of Shan, Maw Chee and Hpa Saung areas of Karenni state, Myaing township in Magway region, Inndaw, Bannmauk and Kani townships of Sagaing respectively. These townships are already imposed with junta’s internet shutdown restrictions.
Various reasons cited by the armed groups to justify internet access restrictions
Considering the various reasons cited by the armed forces to justify internet access restrictions, over 40% of them were around risks of targeted airstrike.
We observe that the terror airstrikes not only take the lives of civilians, but also threaten civilians’ right to life and crucial communication.
The armed forces, in addition to imposing orders restricting civilian’s access to the internet, also conducted restrictions aimed to curb freedom of expression.
In June 16 2025, public administration office of Lauk Tu region made an announcement to restrict civilian’s access to internet and their freedom of expression.
Additionally DVB reported an incident detailing an assault by the armed group of people in an internet cafe for operating beyond internet curfew order or 10 PM. We access this as a lawless repression on the public through bodily harm.
We also observed that an initiative by AA which would allow civilians to access Starlink internet with the deposit of 1 million MMK was not yet implemented until the end of 2025.
(5) Legislations by the Junta Restricting Digital Freedom
The military junta continued their unilateral legislations to further restrict internet freedom in addition to imposing a series of internet shutdowns.
During 2025, junta enacted Cyber Security Law and Law on the Protection of Multiparty Democratic Elections from Obstruction, Disruption and Destruction oppressed and threatened internet users.
The cyber security law’s clause requiring digital service providers to retain the user data for 3 years, and its Clause 45 - requiring compliance from service providers to suspend or terminate service upon request, along with seizure of equipment around service providers - were assessed to be deliberately designed to control service providers and monitor users. Its Clause 70 also carries 1-6 months imprisonment and/or fine of 1 to 10 million MMK for providing VPN services without registration/approval. This poses a threat for VPN providers amidst the censorship situation in Myanmar.
On the date of August 1, 2025 Ming Aung Hlaing led State Security and Peace Commission extended the suspension of major clauses such as clause 5, 7 & 8 of the Law Protecting the Security and Privacy of Citizens.
This legislation strips the citizens’ crucial legal protection against request of information from service providers and seizure of devices by the security forces.
“Law on the Protection of Multiparty Democratic Elections from Obstruction, Disruption and Destruction” was enacted on July 29, 2025 to suppress dissenting voices against their planned election.
Its clause 16 barred anyone from speeches, rallies, expression and call against the Multiparty Democratic Election or part of its process in any way online and offline.
Those found to be in violation against clause 16 is punishable by 3-7 years imprisonment along with fines as dictated by clause 23(a). These two clauses (16 & 23(a)) has been observed to be leveraged by the junta to crack down dissenting voices online. MIP’s November 19, 2025 article documented that 34.4% of the personnel charged with this law were of online origin. We documented that out of 197 personnel arrested by the junta because of their online activities, at least 34 personnel were charged with this electoral law.
The junta also formed a working group for drafting “National AI Strategy & National AI Policy” dictating values, norms and rules on the use of Artificial Intelligence technology.
(6) Crack Down on Freedom of Expression Online During 2025
The military junta continued monitoring of online spaces and arrest and crack down on dissenting users. Data For Myanmar’s November 3, 2025 report documented 1993 personnel put behind bars for expressing/interacting on social media from 2022 February to 2025 October. Myanmar Internet Project also documented 197 arrested personnel for their social media activity during the year 2025.
During 2025, 127 males and 59 women (11 unspecified) were arrested because of their online activities. We note that 30% of them were targeted to women.
Although the junta has been conducting these arrests based on social media and online activities, we noticed a pattern change in terms of charges they were held against in 2025. This indicates changes in terms of their repression pattern rather than a reduced number of arrests.
The electoral law that was enacted on July 29, 2025 was a major tool of legal oppression. MIP documented the arrests until during the year of 2025 and documented by names at least 34 personnel were charged with electoral law as stated above.
Of 153 arrested individuals, 77.66% of them were arrested due to their activities on Facebook and 21.83%(43 personnel) were charged due to their activity on TikTok.
The junta has been continuously monitoring viral social media activities and cracking down on freedom of expression online.
Analyzing these arrests by location, we identified that of them 50 personnel were from Yangon, 53 from Bago, and 35 personnel are from Mandalay. These 3 states/regions accounted for 70.5% of the arrests based on social media activity.
We also note that these 3 regions are junta controlled areas - implying that the junta disrupt connectivity in the contested areas where they focus on curbing freedom of expression in their administrative strongholds.
(7) Surveillance Situation in 2025
(A) Enacting Cyber Security Law for Surveillance
On January 1, 2025 the junta enacted Cyber Security Law to curb the use of VPN along with strict monitoring of internet users unilaterally. The law came into effect on July 30, 2025. Prior to the law’s coming into effect, junta’s security forces conducted device checks and extortions in areas such as Yangon and other regions. With the law coming into effect, security forces in Ayeyarwaddy, Mandalay, and Myitkyinar of Kachin state followed suit and conducted mobile device checks on VPN use. Whereas the law only dictated compliance and registration from VPN service providers, on the ground, VPN use is practically criminalized.
(B) Arrests and surveillance through the Person Scrutinizing and Monitoring System (PSMS)
PSMS, referring to Person Scrutinizing and Monitoring System, backed by Russia, contained a list of members of Civil Disobedience Movement (CDM) and army deserters facilitated arrest of dissidents starting from May. People’s Spring reported the arrest of 1657 personnel from March to May facilitated through this PSMS technology.
In addition to the junta’s use of PSMS in checkpoints, the technology was also used to monitor civilians in accommodation facilities and express lines with this technology as well. The use of PSMS during guest registration checks in Mandalay, Bagan were reported. Junta-controlled Ministry of Information reported the use of PSMS technology in Myit Thar township on August 4, 2025. People's Voice also reported the use of PSMS and scaling out of this technology as their planned election approached. During their sham election period, leaked directives reported use of PSMS technology in Yangon form regular household and guest registration checks
(C) Other Initiatives of Surveillance Development in 2025
One of the junta’s initiative to surveil the internet was the formation of 24/7 monitoring teams under the command of the deputy minister of the Ministry of Home Affairs to combat news and political attacks against the junta online. This directly threatens the freedom of expression online.
The junta controlled Central Bank also collaborated with Huawei for incorporation of Artificial Intelligence in the banking sector. The junta also monitored bank transactions that led to the arrest of users. Use of AI for monitoring of online transaction will further empower their surveillance capabilities. Interesting Engineering also reported Junta’s employment of Tiangou Secure Gateway system across 26 data centers in Myanmar for simultaneous monitoring of 81 million TCP connections through a live dashboard. We identified patterns indicating the junta’s ironhold on the internet in 2025.
(8) Crackdown on Press Freedom
(A) Junta’s Crackdown on Press Freedom
2025 also entailed junta’s continuous crackdown on independent media. 2 of the arrested DMG journalists were further charged with clause 96 of the Broadcasting Law and sentenced with additional 5 year sentences. Junta’s spokesperson Maung Maung Ohm threatened media coverage defacing the military.
Independent Press Council of Myanmar (IPCM) announcement on January 17, 2026 detailed 22 male and 5 female journalists behind bars. Committee to Protect Journalists’ January report ranked Myanmar as the third worst jailer of journalists
IPCM and civil society organizations made a statement urging free press access during the aftermath of the Myanmar earthquake of March 28, 2025. Starlink also extended support through distribution of starlink kits for unconnected areas after the earthquake which was ignored by the junta.
The electoral law was also used by the junta as a tool of oppression against press freedom in Myanmar in 2025. The law was used to make charges against media pages and other pages on social media. “Hlaing Info” Telegram Channel, Khit Thit Media, and The Assistance Association for Myanmar-based Independent Journalists, AAMIJ are currently charged under this law. Additionally a satire page, လူထုသတင်းစာတိုက် was also charged similarly. RSF index ranked Myanmar as 169 out of 180 in 2025 for media freedom as unfree.
(B) Junta Allied and Aligned Media Collaborations
The jailor of journalists, the junta, not only conducts crackdown on independent media, they also strengthen collaboration with their allied countries and media.
Junta-controlled Press Media Council and National Press Council of Thailand (NPCT) signed a MoU on August 1, 2025. Junta and Belarussian army also started collaborating on information warfare and press media. Additionally MPA reported bribery of journalists to endorse their sham election. Junta appointed secretary of Press Media Council, U Aye Chan and 2 of the junta aligned journalists were invited to the trip to India for excursion.
(c) Press Freedom in Conflict with Armed Groups
Not only did the media face junta’s brutal crackdown, other conflicts were reported involving Armed Groups in 2025.
Mudra, a women journalist from Maungdaw based Border News Agency(BNA) was arrested by the Arakan Army(AA) on September 20, 2025, she was only released from detention on October 22, 2025. Furthermore, AA reportedly barred its forces and its regional administrative officers from interviewing with the media. Moreover, U Toe Gyi, a journalist from Upper Burma News Agency(UBNA) was detained by two armed group of people citing military espionage.
(9) Regional Efforts for Digital Freedom
In response to the waves of repression, human rights organization, rights based groups and independent media pushed for international advocacy and awareness.
Myanmar Now, in collaboration with Finance Uncovered, investigation on Frontiir, one of the major internet service providers, revealed Myanmar Net’s installation of TSG firewall system at their own data center in Yangon. The TSG firewall system was produced by Geedge Networks and it was helmed by Fang Binxing, who is regarded as the Father of the Great Firewall system in China. TSG’s capability to conduct Deep Packet Inspection (DPI) put its users at privacy risks. The investigation also detailed that Frontiir’s funds included 40 million development funds from the United Kingdom, Norway and Denmark. Justice for Myanmar’s further investigation revealed installation of similar systems at 13 major operators in Myanmar.
Justice For Myanmar also investigated the sale of MOBILedit Pro Forensic to Myanmar and call for accountability of its seller, a Czechoslovakian company, Compelsion. JFM’s June report also detailed junta's firewall technology for web traffic interception and use of DPI for decryption of traffic. United Nations Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar, Tom Andrew called for block of sales/services and export of surveillance technology to Myanmar by governments and private companies.
Myanmar Internet Project is also included in the accountability mechanism to hold Telenor responsible for disclosure of data containing sensitive information of its users to the Myanmar government. Justice for Myanmar and ICJ Norway also filed criminal complaints to Norwegian police on Telenor for violating sanctions.
The military’s propaganda outlets were removed from Twitch, Facebook, Youtube and Media Fire in response to complaints from Justice For Myanmar and Civil Society organizations. After being removed from Twitch, an amazon owned platform, the propaganda outlets migrated to Australian based Kick platform which only laster for a few hours before removal. Tiktok also removed Junta controlled MWD News from its platform.
US based End-User Review Committee (ERC) also listed Mytel on their Entity List for its compliance and involvement in surveilling users in Myanmar.
The above initiatives by the human rights and digital rights organizations and media significantly pushed back the repression during the 2025
(10) Finding
(a) During 2025, Junta conducted 105 instances of internet shutdown across 73 townships.
(b) Over 96% of the casualties of Junta’s terror airstrike campaigns occurred in Internet shutdown areas.
(c) The Junta enacted 3 legislations to suppress internet freedom in Myanmar
(d) Further restriction on civilian’s VPN use, and junta’s deployment of PSMS technology threatened civilians online and offline.
(e) Junta led monitoring of social media accelerated through formation of monitoring groups
(f) Internet shutdowns are not exclusively mandated by the junta but also the armed groups as well
(11) Recommendations
We urge for following recommendations to respond to the junta's oppression and deteriorating situation in Myanmar.
(a) International Community and Organizations
To place effective bars and restrictions to prevent Junta’s access to network monitoring and surveillance technology.
To pressure respective private institutions to bar the junta’s access to their surveillance technology.
To conduct a remedy process for damages resulting from this technology exchange.
(b) Digital Rights Organizations
Digital rights organizations are urged to produce effective mitigation measures against the junta’s tools of oppression.
To find collaborative solutions to circumvent regional internet shutdowns.
To call for international awareness of the deteriorating digital rights situation in Myanmar.
(c) Support and Funding Organizations
Support and Funding Organizations to continue routing critical funds to the organizations working for the mitigations against this digital oppression in Myanmar.
(d) Tech Companies
Tech companies to explore and deploy innovative circumvention solutions against internet shutdowns and internet surveillance.
To support technology to circumvent social media block and enable and strengthen the information ecosystem.
To effectively revoke junta’s access to digital repression tools.
Recommended Citation Style - Myanmar Internet Project(2026, January 30)
2025 Yearly Report on Digital Repression in Myanmar,
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