Digital Oppression Issues from November 2025 to January 2026
- Myanmar Internet Project
- 7 hours ago
- 12 min read
The period from November 2025 to January 2026 was one during which the military junta maintained its usurped power and also oversaw a sham election tailored to its interests.
During preparations for the sham election, the military regime monitored and arrested individuals for online discussions related to the election around the clock, and it was observed that they took action to impose penalties. Additionally, there was an increase in internet disruptions and the use of the “Person Scrutinization and Monitoring System (PSMS)” for inspections. Due to such internet shutdowns and restrictions, Myanmar continued to be listed alongside China as the country with the worst internet freedom in Freedom House’s Freedom on the Net 2025 report.
This report compiles findings related to incidents of digital repression experienced between November 2025 and January 2026.
1. Summary of Digital Repression Incidents Experienced in November 2025
(1.1) Mobile Phone and Internet Shutdowns
(1.2) Arrests and Legal Actions Related to Online Expression
(1.3) The Military Council’s Surveillance Measures on the General Public
(1.1) Mobile Phone and Internet Shutdowns
During November 2025, Myanmar’s communication sphere experienced nationwide difficulties in accessing the internet, attributed to alleged technical malfunctions, as well as communications disruptions due to the military council’s strategic objectives. Additionally, it was observed that some revolutionary forces imposed restrictions and controls on public internet usage.
(a) Nationwide Internet Accessibility Difficulties Attributed to Technical Malfunctions
On November 1, 2025, citing a submarine fiber optic cable malfunction, nearly all Wi-Fi services across the country, including in Yangon, were disrupted. Even after services were restored, users experienced continued slowness in Wi-Fi connections. Following this slowdown of internet lines, a situation persisted where many commonly used VPNs became inaccessible. The AAMIJ news agency reported, citing a statement from a technical officer of the military council, that this situation of internet disruptions and slow speeds would only improve after the military commission’s election period had passed.
(b) Internet Disruptions by the Military Council as Part of Military and Security Strategy
Public mobile phone usage was affected due to the military council’s use of jammers during its events. Additionally, it was found that the military group carried out mobile network disruptions during times of planned military operations.
In Monywa, Sagaing Region, during a Ka Htain (Kathina) festival procession, the use of jammers by the military council caused local residents to experience temporary mobile network outages. Mobile networks were also cut off in Pale and Salingyi Townships, Sagaing Region, as the military council conducted military offensives.
In Maungdaw Tanintharyi Region, clashes occurred, leading to difficulties in mobile network connectivity. In Launglon Township, mobile networks were cut off while preparations for a military offensive were underway. Furthermore, in Zadi Village, Ye Phyu Township, Tanintharyi Region, cutting off the electricity supply caused internet lines to be disrupted.
In the northern part of Ywangan Township, southern Shan State, it was observed that mobile and internet lines were being cut off daily starting from 7:00 PM. The above situations are clear evidence that the military council is strategically using telecommunications disruption as a tactical weapon.
(c) TNLA’s Restrictions on Internet Use
In addition to internet disruptions by the Military Council, it has been observed that the TNLA, an ethnic armed organisation, also restricted the use of Starlink internet in Namtu Town, which is under its control, and took action to arrest Starlink owners and confiscate their equipment.
(1.2) Arrests and Legal Actions Related to Online Expression
The military council continues to monitor and arrest individuals for online expression. According to a statement by Data For Myanmar, from February 2022 to October 2025, a total of 1,993 people were arrested for their comments on social media.
Based on data collected by the Myanmar Internet Project (MIP), at least 6 men and 3 women, totalling 9 individuals, were arrested this month for their online expression. Among those arrested, 4 individuals were detained under Section 23(a) of the law for protecting against the disruption, obstruction, or destruction of multi-party democratic general elections.
Furthermore, regarding the Taung Wine Mountain land clearance incident, the military council also arrested a monk from the Sasana Nwe Foundation and two assistants (Kappiya) for their posts on social media. Such arrests highlights the declining state of freedom of expression under the military council.
(1.3) The Military Council’s Surveillance Measures on the General Public
In November 2025, the military commission established technology teams to more strictly monitor online and on-ground conditions, imposed restrictions on the use of cryptocurrency, and intensified the use of digital systems at checkpoints.
To monitor and take real-time action against information on the internet, the military commission, led by the Deputy Minister of Home Affairs, formed committees with technical experts and prepared for 24-hour surveillance. This is also an action taken by the military commission to increase repression against online speech that differs from its own views.
The Central Bank, under the military commission, also issued a warning against trading, transferring, and storing unauthorised digital currencies (Crypto Assets). This is done with the intention of controlling the flow of digital currencies, which is difficult to trace.
As the sham election drew closer, the military commission increasingly conducted arrests at checkpoints using the Person Scrutinization and Monitoring System (PSMS). People’s Voice reported that a man was arrested during a PSMS inspection at the Mone Nyoung checkpoint in southern Shan State.
2. Summary of Digital Repression Incidents Experienced in December 2025
(2.1) Mobile Phone and Internet Shutdowns
(2.2) Arrests and Legal Actions Related to Online Expression
(2.3) The Military Council’s Surveillance Measures on the General Public
(2.4) Situation of Press Freedom
(2.5) Disruptions of the Military Council’s Information Dissemination Platforms
(2.1) Mobile Phone and Internet Shutdowns
In December 2025, some communication restrictions and control situations continued to occur. It was particularly noted that the timeline announced by the military commission for the restoration of internet lines coincided with the end of the first phase of the sham election.
Communication Blackouts Related to Conflict
The Ministry of Transport and Communications announced that internet lines, which began experiencing slowdowns and disruptions from November 1, would only be fully restored by the end of December. This timeline coincides with the conclusion of the first phase of the military council’s election, leading to the strong likelihood that the current internet disruption situation is intended to control information flow during the sham election period. Furthermore, in Putao, Kachin State, where the internet has been cut off, military commission troops seized Starlink devices that residents were using as alternatives. According to news reports, the seized devices will only be returned after the sham election is over. This situation reflects measures taken by the military council to control and restrict information circulation during the sham election period.
(a) Communication Blackouts Related to Conflict
It has also been observed that during military operations, methods of cutting off communications have been used to keep local populations in the dark and to ensure the security of their leadership.
When Soe Win, vice-senior general, came to Yangon to attend a military nurse training graduation ceremony, phone and internet lines were disrupted in some neighbourhoods of Mingaladon and North Okkalapa townships due to the use of Anti-Drone Guard and Jammers. In Thanlyin Township, Yangon Region, communication lines were also cut off because it was said that the military leader would be visiting. In villages in Natmauk Township, Bago Region, phone and internet lines were cut, and bombing raids were carried out.
In western Banmauk, Upper Sagaing Region, the resumption of MPT phone lines was seen as a relaxation measure.
(b) Restrictions on Internet Use by Revolutionary Forces
During December, it was also observed that revolutionary forces imposed a restriction affecting public internet usage. In Indaw Township, Sagaing Region, the Indaw People’s Administration (Pa-Ah-Hpa) ordered the shutdown of Starlink internet use until the end of December, citing military conditions. In Ramree Township, Rakhine State, the Arakan Army (ULA/AA) has also cut off phone communication permissions for about three months.
Amidst such multifaceted difficulties in internet usage, it was noted that when the National Unity Government (NUG) was reorganised, the Ministry of Communications was omitted.
(2.2) Arrests and Legal Actions Related to Online Expression
This month, it was observed that the military council continued to monitor and arrest individuals for their online expression. The Myanmar Internet Project (MIP) was able to collect data indicating that at least 27 people—18 men and 9 women—were arrested for their online expression. Among those subjected to such surveillance and action, it was found that up to 21 individuals were penalised under the law for protecting against the disruption, obstruction, or destruction of multi-party democratic general elections.
While the military group monitors and takes action against online expression on one hand, it also disseminates misinformation on the other. According to a release by the Myanmar Fact Checking Network, it was found that the military council spreads false information through propaganda channels in areas it has militarily lost.
(2.3) The Military Council’s Surveillance Measures on the General Public
December is the period when the military council’s sham election began, leading to an intensification of technological surveillance. It was also observed that the United Nations issued warnings regarding the state of digital surveillance in Myanmar.
(a) Digital Surveillance Related to the Sham Election
The United Nations warned that the military council may conduct electronic surveillance at polling stations. U Myint Kyaing, the Minister of Immigration and Population, stated that foreign nationals entering to observe the sham election would be under constant surveillance. In the period leading up to the sham election, inspections of mobile phones carried by pedestrians in Mandalay City increased significantly.
(b) Increased Use of the PSMS System and Cross-Border Controls
In Yangon, during guest registration checks, it was observed that the military council began using the Person Scrutinization and Monitoring System (PSMS) to verify the data of individual persons. CDM (Civil Disobedience Movement) staff in Thailand were not granted extensions for their Certificate of Identity (CI) documents, causing difficulties for Myanmar citizens who, for various reasons, had fled to Thailand and had participated in the CDM movement after the military coup. This situation serves as evidence that the military council is systematically compiling digital records and preparing to exert control even over citizens abroad. Furthermore, strike committees revealed that digital technologies, such as phone interceptions, tracking phone SIM cards, and tracing through CCTV records, are being increasingly utilised to arrest strike leaders.
(2.4) Situation of Press Freedom
In 2025, while some media personnel were released under the military council’s amnesty, it was also observed that severe prison sentences continued to be imposed on journalists and legal threats persisted.
In September 2024, freelance journalist Ma Sut Ring Pan (an ethnic Kachin), who had been arrested, was sentenced to 3 years in prison under Section 505(a) of the Penal Code and 10 years under Section 50(j) of the Counter-Terrorism Law, totalling 13 years in prison.
The law protecting the sham election has become a major challenge for media outlets. The media community has stated that the election protection law enacted by the military council poses a threat to the media. This law also restricts the ability to freely criticise and comment on the electoral process.
Journalist U Sithu Aung Myint, Ma Htet Htet Khaing from BBC Media Action, and several other journalists were released under an amnesty.
(2.5) Disruptions of the Military Council’s Information Dissemination Platforms
In December 2025, within the digital sphere, it was observed that some successful efforts were made to restrict and block the military council’s information flow.
The Justice For Myanmar group announced that the military council’s propaganda accounts on Twitch, Facebook, YouTube, and MediaFire had been removed. According to Justice For Myanmar, the removal of the military council’s propaganda accounts was a result of their reporting efforts. Australian technology company Kick initially allowed direct broadcasts from illegal Myanmar military junta propaganda accounts but removed and shut down those accounts within hours, as reported by the Justice For Myanmar group. The TikTok page of the Myanmar military propaganda channel, Myawady Television (MWD News), was also removed.
3. Summary of Digital Repression Incidents Faced in January 2026
This month witnessed the second and third parts of the military council’s staged election. Throughout this month, numerous acts of digital repression were observed, including internet shutdowns, suppression of freedom of expression online, and restrictions on media freedom.
(3.1) Mobile Phone and Internet Shutdowns
(3.2) Arrests and Legal Actions Related to Online Expression
(3.3) The Military Council’s Surveillance Measures on the General Public
(3.4) Situation of Press Freedom
(3.5) Disruptions of the Military Council’s Information Dissemination Platforms
(3.1) Mobile Phone and Internet Shutdowns
It was observed that the military council carried out targeted communication shutdowns in areas of intense military conflict, and there were also some communication restrictions imposed by revolutionary forces.
(a) Restrictions and Controls on Communication Services by the Military Council
In Katha, Sagaing Region, as clashes intensified between the military council and revolutionary forces, phone lines began to be cut off. By January 13, phone lines within Katha town were completely cut off, making it difficult even to contact those displaced by the conflict.
In Yebyu, eastern Dawei, Launglon, and Myeik areas, as well as Kyunsu town in Tanintharyi Region, internet lines were cut off during the period between the first and second phases of the election, alongside airstrikes. Additionally, in some neighbourhoods and villages of Myitkyina, Nanmati, Mogaung, Monghnyin, and Puta-O townships in Kachin State, Mytel phone lines were cut off again.
In Aunglan Township, Magway Region, during preparations for a wedding ceremony in Tatkon village, the military council carried out a bombing attack, and it was found that internet lines were also cut off. The People’s Voice reported that as the time for the military council’s third phase of the sham election approached, internet services in townships in southern Shan State became unusably slow. Furthermore, the military council also carried out an airstrike on a public internet access point in Ponnagyun, Rakhine State.
(b) Communication Restrictions by Revolutionary Forces
This month, while the military council carried out communication disruptions in various areas across many regions, revolutionary forces also conducted seizures of publicly used Starlink Wi-Fi devices in some locations.
In Kyauktaw Township, Rakhine State, the Arakan Army (AA) confiscated privately owned Starlink devices. Residents in Ramree, Rakhine State, where the internet has been cut off, are making demands to the Arakan Army (AA) to provide temporary internet service plans.
In Nabar Village, Indaw Township, Sagaing Region, citing military conditions, the People’s Administration (Pa-Ah-Hpa) and People’s Defense Force (Pa-Ka-Hpa) seized 15 Starlink Wi-Fi devices.
(3.2) Arrests and Legal Actions Related to Online Expression
It was observed that the military council, with the assistance of pro-military lobbies, continues to monitor online speech. U Kyi Myo Zaw (alias U Kyi), who operate lunchbox service, was arrested and charged after lobbies incited allegations that he had criticised the coup leader on social media.
Due to using the term “2021 Spring Revolution” during campaign activities for the sham election on TikTok, U Lwin Myint, a People’s Parliament candidate from Thingangyun Township who competed in the first phase of the election, was sentenced to one year of hard labour and imprisonment.
The Myanmar Internet Project (MIP) collected data indicating that at least 13 individuals—9 men and 4 women—were arrested for their online expression. Among those subjected to surveillance and legal action, it was found that up to 4 individuals were penalised under the law for protecting against the disruption, obstruction, or destruction of multi-party democratic general elections.
(3.3) The Military Council’s Surveillance Measures on the General Public
The military council continues to relentlessly monitor and track the public. In Mandalay, inspections of pedestrians’ mobile phones have resumed, and at the military council’s Yae Ni checkpoint on the old Yangon-Mandalay road, individuals are being photographed and checked one by one.
The Central Bank, under the military council, is also working to link and monitor financial transactions through the e-ID system and SIM card registration. When global gold price fluctuations caused the exchange rate of dollars and Myanmar kyat to fall, the military council announced that it had closed 1,342 bank accounts for allegedly illegally selling and exchanging foreign currencies on social media pages.
The above incidents demonstrate that the military council is monitoring public activities, including online usage and ground movements.
(3.4) Situation of Press Freedom
During the five years since the coup, the state of media freedom has continued to decline. Journalists have stated that they are unable to freely cover the election led by the military council. “Some journalists had to return early because they were not even allowed to take photos outside the polling stations, which are not part of the polling compound,” said a journalist who covered the military council’s election in Kawhmu Town.
The Independent Press Council Myanmar (IPCM) announced that a total of 27 journalists, including 5 female journalists, are still detained in various prisons across Myanmar.
On one hand, independent media are being suppressed, while on the other hand, the military council is using its propaganda media to justify human rights violations. A report by the Myanmar Fact-Checking Network also indicated that there are deliberate attempts to conceal war crimes and human rights violations through the military council’s propaganda media.
(3.5) Disruptions of the Military Council’s Information Dissemination Platforms
While suppressing domestic internet usage and heavily repressing public online expression by the military council, it was observed that human rights organisations also made various efforts to counter the military council’s information dissemination platforms.
The Justice for Myanmar group revealed that Facebook removed over 1,000 pages, groups, and accounts linked to the telecom operator Mytel, in which the military council holds a majority stake. Their statement indicated that these pages, along with the already taken-down ‘MRTV Friday Night Live Show’ page, had been reported to Facebook. The ‘Justice for Myanmar’ group further announced on January 28, 2026, that Facebook had removed 270 accounts related to the Myanmar military’s business and propaganda activities.
Recommended Citation Style - Myanmar Internet Project(2026, February 14),
Digital oppression issues from November 2025 to January 2026,
EngageMedia is publishing English translations of the Myanmar Digital Coup Quarterly produced by the Myanmar Internet Project. This post covers updates between November 2025 to January 2026 and highlights digital oppression incidents documented during that period. Read the original post in Burmese here, and learn more about EngageMedia’s broader work to support digital rights in Myanmar on EngageMedia.org/Myanmar.
Read the other editions of the report.
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