Myanmar Digital Coup Quarterly: August 2025 - October 2025
- Myanmar Internet Project
- 5 days ago
- 13 min read
It is now only three months until the fifth anniversary of the military coup on February 1, 2021. During this period, the public living in Myanmar have faced various forms of digital rights repression and digital rights violations on a monthly basis.
During the crackdowns that occurred between August and October 2025, there were internet shutdowns, controls on press freedom, surveillance and arrests for online speech, surveillance and arrests through the “Person Scrutinization and Monitoring System (PSMS),” monitoring of VPN usage, and arrests made using election protection laws.
This report compiles and presents findings related to the digital repression incidents that occurred between August and October 2025.
Summary of Digital Repression Incidents in August 2025
Mobile Phone and Internet Shutdowns
Arrests and Legal Actions Related to Online Expression
The Military Council’s Surveillance Measures on the General Public
Situation of Press Freedom
Mobile Phone and Internet Shutdowns
Communication lines were also cut off and controlled in August, based on areas where clashes occurred. While the Military Commission carried out the cuts as a military strategy, it was also found that the Arakan Army (AA), an ethnic revolutionary armed group, temporarily suspended internet services within their territory, citing security reasons.
Communication Blackouts Related to Conflict
It has been observed that situations where communications are cut off during intense fighting have been occurring frequently. Such communication blackouts continue to have severe consequences for civilians living within conflict zones.
In Kyaukphyu Township, Rakhine State, and on the Asian Highway sections in Kawkareik-Myawaddy, Karen State, phone and internet lines were disrupted due to fighting. Particularly in the Kawkareik area, methods such as reducing internet bandwidth were also employed.
Furthermore, it was found that villages in the western part of Seikphyu Township, Magway Region, which had their phone and internet lines cut off, were subsequently subjected to aerial bombardment. This incident serves as evidence that communication blackouts, which create an information vacuum, can severely compromise the security of civilians.
Control over Communication Networks by Relevant Organizations
Both the Military Commission and revolutionary forces have attempted to control communication networks within their territories.
The Arakan Army (AA) announced on August 27 that it was temporarily banning Starlink internet services in the Arakan liberated areas due to the risk of airstrikes. Furthermore, it was observed that in Manaung Township, Rakhine State, the Rakhine Nationalities Party (RNP), which is preparing to contest the election held by the Military Commission, demanded the restoration of phone lines. This demand from a pro-regime party preparing to participate in the Military Commission’s election highlights the significant impact that communication blackouts are having on political mobilisation within the region.
Arrests and Legal Actions Related to Online Expression
Throughout August 2025, the Military Commission continued to enforce oppressive laws to control online expression and carried out widespread arrests and legal actions targeting civilians from all walks of life, including their own supporters.
Strengthening the Legal Basis for Repression
The Military Commission has often attempted to secure legal cover to legitimise its repressive actions. On August 1, the National Defense and Security Council (NDSC), led by Min Aung Hlaing, extended the suspension of key articles (5), (7), and (8) of the Law Protecting the Privacy and Security of Citizens (Privacy Law).
This extension meant that a crucial legal protection for personal data—the provision stating that “personal telephone and electronic communication information from telecommunications operators shall not be requested or provided”—remained effectively void.
The Widening Scope of Repression
Arrests and legal actions are observed to be targeting not only political activists but also ordinary civilians and even pro-military supporters who criticise them.
Zaw Hpone Hein, a pro-military supporter who criticised military leaders, was sentenced to 11 years in prison. This demonstrates that the military will not tolerate any criticism of its leadership.
Furthermore, online comments and expressions are being monitored and acted upon. According to data collected by the Myanmar Internet Project, at least 13 people were arrested in one month for their posts on social networks.
In Bago, no fewer than 11 residents were arrested for commenting under a news story about a general’s statue being vandalised. In Taunggyi, a man was arrested under election interference laws for writing on social media, “If you want votes from the people, you should think about how to serve the people.”
The Military Council’s Surveillance Measures on the General Public
The Military Commission intensified its efforts to monitor and control the public through various methods. This month, instances were observed of targeting, arresting, and extorting VPN users, as well as the widespread implementation and use of the PSMS system.
Targeting VPN Usage
Using the Cybersecurity Law, which came into effect on July 30, as a pretext, the military group (the SAC) has been arresting, interrogating, and extorting money from VPN users.
In Mandalay, following the enactment of the Cybersecurity Law, military and Pyu Saw Htee joint forces, as well as vehicle inspection teams, not only checked car and motorcycle licenses and the validity of driver’s licenses but also inspected phones for the use of Facebook and Gmail accounts, and checked for the use of VPN software. At the Pan Daing checkpoint in the Ayeyarwady Region, four travellers were arrested after VPNs were allegedly found on their phones.
In Yangon and Mandalay, SAC troops and their subordinate Pyu Saw Htee members resumed the practice of arresting and extorting money from VPN users. In Daydaye Township, Ayeyarwady Region, four individuals arrested for using VPNs were only released after each paid 500,000 kyats.
Widespread Deployment of the PSMS System
It has been observed that the PSMS (Person Scrutinization and Monitoring System) is being integrated down to the township-level administration to track down individuals associated with the revolution.
The Military Commission’s Ministry of Information (MOI) website officially stated that inspections using the PSMS system are being conducted in Myittha Township. In Mandalay, the PSMS system has been used in conjunction with guest list checks, and in Taunggyi Township, the General Administration Department officially instructed the use of PSMS for inspections and arrests at hotels, guesthouses, checkpoints, and transport lines.
The situations described above demonstrate that the military council is now widely deploying the PSMS system within its administrative machinery.
Growing Concerns Over the Security of Citizens’ Data
Allegations emerged that Telenor Myanmar transferred users’ metadata to the military. Following this, ‘Justice for Myanmar’ and ‘ICJ Norway’ filed a police report with the Norwegian police against Telenor regarding these violations.
Even a telecommunications company like Telenor, which has the backing of the Norwegian government, has transferred data to the Myanmar military. Now, with foreign investments having largely withdrawn from the telecommunications sector and businesses close to the military council dominating it, the situation has become even more concerning for the security of the public’s personal data.
Situation of Press Freedom
It is observed that the military junta is managing both foreign relations and domestic propaganda machinery in a balanced manner to handle and control the media landscape.
On August 1, the Myanmar News Media Council, subordinate to the Military Commission, and the Thailand News Media Council (NPCT) signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) in Bangkok. This is an action taken by the Military Commission, which heavily suppresses independent media, to strive for greater acceptance within the international media mechanism.
On the other hand, on August 13, the Myanmar Now news agency reported that it had obtained solid evidence that systematic operations using a large number of fake accounts on social networks are being carried out for propaganda campaigns.
Summary of Digital Repression Incidents in September 2025
Mobile Phone and Internet Shutdowns
Arrests and Legal Actions Related to Online Expression
The Military Council’s Surveillance Measures on the General Public
Situation of Press Freedom
Mobile Phone and Internet Shutdowns
In September, communication blackouts occurred in conjunction with the Military Council’s military operations. This further exacerbated the humanitarian crises. On the other hand, it was observed that revolutionary forces, including the National Unity Government (NUG), also began implementing measures to control internet access in their controlled territories based on the military situation.
Communication Blackouts Related to Military Operations and Their Impacts
The Military Council continues to employ communication blackouts as a tactic, resulting in severe consequences.
In villages in Pauk Township, Magway Region, and Budalin Township, Sagaing Region, where internet and phone lines were cut, airstrikes occurred, and a charity hospital was burned down. These are clear instances of attacking civilian targets under a news blackout.
In the eastern forest area of Tanintharyi Region, due to military column operations, fuel could not be delivered to generators on communication towers, causing service disruptions. In conflict areas along the Mon-Tanintharyi border, phone and internet lines were usable for only a few hours per day. Additionally, the Military Council cut phone and internet lines in Kalay Township, Sagaing Region. According to the Shwe Phee Myay news agency, fighting was intense near Lumyang village in Waingmaw Township and Lansal village, Kachin State, with phone lines reportedly cut from the Chinese side in areas near the Chinese border.
In Khaunglanhpu Township, Kachin State, phone lines were cut, and the military also blocked the flow of goods, leaving locals isolated and facing general hardships.
An analysis of the above communication blackout incidents reveals subsequent negative effects, including impacts on trade flows, exposure to life-threatening attacks during information blackouts, and damage to basic infrastructure like hospitals. Consequently, while movement is difficult due to the communication cuts, locals are increasingly suffering from subsequent social hardships.
Control of Internet Networks by Relevant Authorities
Not only the Military Council, but also the revolutionary forces have been controlling and administering internet networks within their territories.
In Banmauk Township, Sagaing Region, the People’s Administration Team (PAB), citing security reasons, indefinitely shut down internet lines within their controlled area. Similarly, in Kani Township, the NUG also instructed internet cafes to temporarily close due to the military situation.
In Sittwe, Rakhine State, the Military Council cut off Mytel phone lines again in August without providing a reason, after having restored them earlier. This demonstrates that the Military Council is arbitrarily controlling and manipulating the communication network.
Technical Blocking
During this September, situations arose where some commonly used VPNs could no longer be accessed. This clearly indicates that, in addition to cutting communication towers, the military council is continuing to technically target and attack methods used by internet users to circumvent blocks.
Arrests and Legal Actions Related to Online Expression
The Military Commission intensively carried out arrests and legal actions using the “Law on the Prevention of Disruption and Interference with Elections,” primarily targeting online criticism of the election they are planning to hold.
The Ministry of Home Affairs stated that they had taken action against online writings and distributions aimed at disrupting the election. Subsequently, arrests using this law were carried out consecutively. The military council announced that it had taken action against 9 civilians, including 3 minors, using the “Law on the Prevention of Disruption and Interference with Elections,” citing various reasons, including the pretext of election interference through social media.
It is also observed that severe penalties were imposed on those punished under this law. In Taunggyi, a person arrested under the “Law on the Prevention of Disruption and Interference with Elections” was sentenced to 7 years in prison with hard labour. According to data collected by the Myanmar Internet Project (MIP), the total number of people arrested this month for their posts on social networks was at least 11.
The Military Council’s Surveillance Measures on the General Public
The Military Council’s surveillance and tracking of the public is being conducted on the ground using systems like PSMS (Person Scrutinization and Monitoring System) to carry out inspections and arrests. Furthermore, evidence emerged this month indicating the deployment and use of Chinese-made technologies capable of monitoring the entire internet network.
Direct Ground Inspections and Arrests Using Digital Systems
The Military Council is widely using the PSMS software.
In the ancient city of Bagan, Nyaung-U Township, inspections using the PSMS system are being conducted during guest registration checks at hotels and guesthouses, leading to the arrest of some Civil Disobedience Movement (CDM) staff who had travelled for pilgrimage.
Expansion of the Surveillance Network
The Military Council is implementing a nationwide network surveillance system using Chinese technology.
The group Justice for Myanmar (JFM) revealed that the Military Council is using network surveillance equipment from the Chinese company ‘Geedge Networks’ installed at 13 domestic telecommunications companies to monitor domestic internet users.
According to a disclosure by Interesting Engineering, an internet censorship system named “Tiangou” is reportedly installed and operating in all 26 data centres in Myanmar. Interesting Engineering stated that this system has the capability to simultaneously monitor over 80 million TCP connections.
The Central Bank, subordinate to the Military Council, held discussions with the Chinese company Huawei to enable the use of Artificial Intelligence (AI) technology in Myanmar’s banking operations. This move is intended to track and monitor financial transactions using advanced technology. These are pieces of evidence that the Military Council is expanding its surveillance network using advanced technologies.
Situation of Press Freedom
The situation regarding media freedom has seen not only controls by the Military Council but also certain restrictive conditions imposed by revolutionary organisations.
The Arakan Army (AA)’s Increasing Control Over the Media
The Arakan Army (AA) has taken actions to restrict media access in order to control the flow of
information within its administrative territories.
The Arakan Army (AA) has prohibited all departmental staff under its administration from giving interviews to news media. It has also been observed that the AA arrested a female reporter from the Maungdaw-based Border News Agency (BNA).
The Military Council’s Co-optation of News Media
It has been observed that the Military Council is also attempting to co-opt domestic media personnel with money for its propaganda machinery. The MPA news agency exposed that the Military Council is offering hundreds of thousands of kyat to domestic media personnel to co-opt them into writing propaganda news for their election.
This September, it was also found that India invited two propagandists from the Military Council and U Aye Chan, the Secretary of the Myanmar Media Council, for a journalist study tour.
Summary of Digital Repression Incidents in October 2025
Mobile Phone and Internet Shutdowns
Arrests and Legal Actions Related to Online Expression
The Military Council’s Surveillance Measures on the General Public
Situation of Press Freedom
Mobile Phone and Internet Shutdowns
Communication blackouts continue to be a strategic advantage for the military council. In particular, cutting communications to target areas before conducting airstrikes and implementing temporary blackouts for the security of military leaders demonstrates the military council’s control over communications.
Furthermore, the Starlink internet network, relied upon for communication in areas experiencing internet blackouts, has faced network instability along with pressure from the US Congress due to its use by online scam operations.
Use of Communication Blackouts as a Strategy for Airstrikes
The military council used the cutting of communication lines before conducting airstrikes as a military tactic.
In Namtu, northern Shan State, phone lines were cut and the town was bombed, resulting in the deaths of 4 civilians, including children and women, and at least 7 others were injured. Representatives from the strike force stated at a press conference that phone lines were cut before the aerial bombardment of Bom To village in Chaung-U Township, Sagaing Region, where mass casualties occurred.
Temporary Blackouts and the Use of Jammers
Local communities face disruptions to communication networks due to the use of jammers inside Military Council camps.
Due to the use of jammers in the Military Council camps stationed within Kawkareik Township, Karen State, locals are facing disruptions to phone and internet lines. Temporary internet outages also occurred in Mandalay city due to the use of jammers when a military leader visited.
The Scam Compound Ripple Effect and the Impact on Starlink Internet Connectivity
In areas facing internet shutdowns by the Military Council, Starlink internet is crucial as a primary source for accessing information.
The expanded use of Starlink terminals by online scam centres in Myawaddy Township, Karen State, which are vital for public access to information, drew the attention of the US Congress. Due to this usage, AFP reported that preparations are being made to inspect Starlink. Following news of these potential investigations, situations arose in some locations inside Myanmar near the Thai border where Starlink terminals could not be used. On October 22, SpaceX disabled 2,500 Starlink terminals in Myanmar which were suspected of being used by online fraud operations in scam compounds, preventing them from accessing the internet.
The Use of Communication Control as a Political Strategy
The Military Council is exploiting its ability to control the communication network and using it as a political strategy.
The military council, which had cut communications across almost the entire Rakhine State, stated it would restore MPT phone lines in Manaung Township, and MPT phone lines became usable again in some areas of Manaung. This move is widely viewed as an attempt to appease the public as the election approaches. Since only the MPT line was made available, in a market lacking competition, the price of a single MPT SIM card in Manaung soared to over 60,000 kyats.
Arrests and Legal Actions Related to Online Expression
The Military Council is continuously carrying out arrests and legal actions against free expression online. On October 10, the DVB news agency reported that in September, in Ayeyarwady Region alone, 5 women and 16 men were arrested for writing posts opposing them online.
Furthermore, using the “Law on the Prevention of Disruption and Interference with Elections,” action was taken against several artists for allegedly making false criticisms on social media regarding their participation in an election campaign video. Those targeted include Director Mike Tee (a.k.a. Thant Zaw), Director Aung Chan Lu, Director Zabu Tun Thet Lwin, supporting actor Kyaw Win Htut (a.k.a. Kyaw Min Htut), and comedian Own Dine (a.k.a. Zaw Myint). It is observed that the Military Council is not only monitoring and acting upon social media criticisms of the election but is also making threats against artists who do not participate in their election campaign activities.
The Military Council announced on October 31st that, under this law, there are 40 cases with a total of 88 individuals charged—83 men and 5 women.
According to data obtained by the Myanmar Internet Project, in October, a total of 23 individuals—4 women and 19 men—were arrested and detained for their online speech.
The Military Council’s Surveillance Measures on the General Public
It is observed that the Military Council is not only implementing internet shutdowns and monitoring/controlling online speech but is also conducting physical surveillance and tracking on the ground.
In the Kyaukpadaung road area, ID card numbers of travellers were checked against the “PSMS” system. In Myitkyina, Kachin State, Military Council troops also conducted random inspections of travellers’ mobile phones. Furthermore, according to reports from news agencies, the Military Council is continuously adding names to the blacklist within the PSMS system. Due to such conditions, Ambassador Kyaw Moe Tun stated at the United Nations that the military junta is building a digital dictatorship.
Situation of Press Freedom
The military council is not only implementing internet shutdowns and monitoring, controlling, and suppressing public speech in the digital sphere, but it is also observed to be preparing to dominate and control the media landscape.
Among these actions, the Military Council is preparing to undertake media cooperation and information sharing with countries with which it has friendly relations. This month, the Military Council and the Belarusian military engaged in cooperation in the field of information and media. In September 2024, they also held discussions on media sector cooperation with Russia.
Recommended Citation Style - Myanmar Internet Project(2025, November 14),
Myanmar Digital Coup Quarterly: August 2025 - October 2025,
EngageMedia is publishing English translations of the Myanmar Digital Coup Quarterly produced by the Myanmar Internet Project. This post covers updates between August 2025 to October 2025 and highlights digital oppression incidents documented during that period. Read the original post in Burmese here, and learn more about EngageMedia’s broader work to support digital rights in Myanmar on EngageMedia.org/Myanmar.
Read the other editions of the report.
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