Myanmar Digital Coup Quarterly: May 2025 - July 2025
- Myanmar Internet Project
- 2 days ago
- 13 min read
Digital Repression Incidents Experienced Between May and July 2025
It has now been exactly four years and six months since Myanmar fell under military rule. Despite enduring a prolonged and difficult period, the movement for liberation from military dictatorship continues to persist with strength and determination.
Just as the pro-democracy resistance forces are fighting back through every means available, the military junta, on the other hand, has also continued to carry out repression through various tactics. Among the repressive actions that occurred between May and July 2025 were familiar patterns such as internet shutdowns, control over press freedom, and arrests for online expression. In addition, surveillance and arrests were increasingly conducted through the use of the Person Scrutinization and Monitoring System (PSMS).
This report compiles and presents key findings related to the digital repression incidents that took place during the period from May to July 2025.
Summary of Digital Repression Incidents Faced in May 2025
Mobile Phone and Internet Shutdowns
Arrests and Legal Actions Related to Online Expression
The Military Council’s Surveillance Measures on the General Public
Situation of Press Freedom
Mobile Phone and Internet Shutdowns
In May, due to ongoing communication blackouts imposed by the military council across Myanmar, the public experienced significant disruptions in accessing information and staying connected. According to a statement from Athan, as of April, a total of 138 townships had faced mobile phone and internet shutdowns.
Military Council’s Use of Communication Networks as Military Targets
The military council has deliberately cut off communication lines in areas where military operations are taking place, treating them as strategic military targets.
In regions like Saw Township and Kyaukhtu Sub-township in Magway Region’s Yaw area, phone lines were disconnected while airstrikes were conducted daily for consecutive days. Similarly, in Gangaw Township, also in Magway Region, phone services were cut off prior to aerial bombing campaigns.
In Rakhine State, during clashes along the Ann-Padan road, phone lines were also disrupted. Furthermore, in Ayeyarwady Region, internet outages were reported frequently starting from May 7, especially in areas like Thabaung, Yegyi, and Kyonpyaw Townships, due to ongoing fighting.
According to KIC (Karen Information Center), the Tanintharyi District, Thaton Township, under KNU Brigade 2, has experienced increasingly severe communication blackouts this year. The military council continues to use communication shutdowns as a strategic weapon in ethnic armed group-controlled areas, treating it as a calculated military tactic.
Repression and Market Impact on Telecommunication Services
As a result of the military council’s shutdown of mobile and internet services, the general public has turned to alternative methods of communication to access information. However, even these alternative channels have been subjected to on-the-ground surveillance and repression by the military.
On May 12, in Khin Mon Village, Chaung-U Township, Sagaing Region, the military raided a Starlink Internet shop and arrested 27 people, both men and women. This incident clearly demonstrates the junta’s crackdown on public attempts to maintain communication through alternative means.
In Kale Township, Sagaing Region, with nearly all communication lines cut, only one MPT (Myanmar Posts and Telecommunications) line remained partially functional. As a result, MPT SIM cards skyrocketed to 45,000 MMK each. In the northern part of Shan State, in areas such as Kunlong and Hsenwi, which are under the control of the Kokang armed group (MNDAA – Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army), Chinese mobile networks were being set up and used in place of local telecom networks.
Communication Restrictions Imposed by Resistance Groups Due to Security Concerns
In addition to the communication shutdowns imposed by the military council, resistance forces themselves have also implemented restrictions on public internet use due to rising security concerns.
In the Mawchi area of Karenni (Kayah) State, the District Joint Administrative Committee temporarily suspended Starlink internet services for one month, citing the threat posed by enemy informants. They also instructed all users to register their access. Additionally, the White Star Force, which operates in the same area, temporarily confiscated Starlink Wi-Fi devices in order to strengthen air defense and ground intelligence security.
In summary, communication blackouts remain a deliberate military tactic used by the junta, posing a serious threat to the public’s right to information and safety. At the same time, the resistance groups’ efforts to control communication networks out of necessity for security illustrate the complex digital landscape during the ongoing conflict brought about by the military coup.
Arrests and Legal Actions Related to Online Expression
While the military council has continued to implement communication shutdowns in some areas, in regions where internet access remains available, they have consistently carried out monthly surveillance and arrests targeting online speech and expression by the public.
In May 2025, an individual named U Kyaw Zeya, known to be a supporter of the military, was arrested for sharing satirical posts about the junta leader and making critical remarks online regarding the military's response to recent earthquakes. This case highlights how even apparent supporters of the regime can face arrest when they post content critical of the military's actions during the coup period.
During the same month, at least 20 individuals—9 men and 11 women—were arrested across the country for their online posts and expressions on social media.
The Military Council’s Surveillance Measures on the General Public
In order to identify and arrest those opposing the regime and individuals involved in the Civil Disobedience Movement (CDM), the military council has intensified its surveillance operations through both digital technologies and on-the-ground inspections.
Arrests Carried Out Through the Use of the PSMS Software
Between March and May 2025, it was reported—citing statements from the Mandalay Region Police Force—that 1,657 people were arrested using the Person Scrutinization and Monitoring System (PSMS). At a checkpoint in Loilen Township, southern Shan State, authorities used the PSMS system to inspect individuals and arrested a resident of Mingaladon Township, Yangon, accusing them of financially supporting PDF (People’s Defense Forces) groups via KPay, according to accounts published by military-aligned lobby groups. In Karenni (Kayah) State, at least four people were reportedly arrested in May alone through the use of this same digital surveillance system.
Direct Inspection of Mobile Phones
While the military council employs advanced digital technologies for surveillance, it also continues to rely on physical inspections as part of its strategy to monitor and arrest civilians.
In Ngaputaw Township, Ayeyarwady Region, junta troops conducted phone inspections among local residents and subsequently arrested four civilians. Similarly, in Kyaukpyu Township, Rakhine State, military battalions reportedly confiscated mobile phones from family members of ethnic Rakhine SAC armed group members, allegedly to prevent information leaks from within the military itself.
These incidents show that the junta’s ground-level surveillance efforts target not only the general public but even individuals within their own military circles, operating under a deep atmosphere of suspicion.
Increased Surveillance Through Internet Service Providers
On May 23, Myanmar Now and Finance Uncovered revealed that Myanmar Net, a domestic internet service provider, is using equipment capable of tracking users’ online activities, blocking websites, and restricting the use of VPNs. This development demonstrates the military council’s expanding online surveillance network through internet service providers, increasing their capacity to monitor and control digital communications.
Situation of Press Freedom
According to the 2025 index by Reporters Without Borders (RSF), Myanmar ranks 169th out of 180 countries in press freedom, placing it in the “very dangerous” (red) zone for media freedom. Since the military coup, over 200 journalists have been arrested, and as of May 3, the Independent Press Council of Myanmar (IPCM) reported that around 40 journalists remain in detention.
In regions like Rakhine State, where long-term internet and phone line shutdowns persist, journalists face significant difficulties in communicating with local sources and delivering timely news reports.
These developments clearly demonstrate the severely restricted state of press freedom in Myanmar.
Summary of Digital Repression Incidents Faced in June 2025
Mobile Phone and Internet Shutdowns
Arrests and Legal Actions Related to Online Expression
Surveillance Measures Taken by the Military Council on the General Public
Mobile Phone and Internet Shutdowns
In June, throughout Myanmar, mobile phone and internet communication networks remained severely disrupted due to ongoing armed conflicts, damage to essential infrastructure, and restrictions imposed by local groups. According to a report by Western News, only about 4% of the population in Rakhine State have access to internet and phone services, highlighting the significant scale of these disruptions.
Communication Cutoffs Directly Related to Armed Conflict
Prior to and during military offensives, including troop advances, the military council strategically cut communication lines.
In villages within Gangaw Township, Magway Region, phone and internet lines were cut off, followed by heavy artillery shelling. Similarly, in the Nyaung-U–Chauk road area of Mandalay Region, phone and internet disruptions occurred during military advances. These instances demonstrate that communication shutdowns are being used as a deliberate strategic tool during the conflict.
Furthermore, after renewed fighting in areas such as Launglon Township in Tanintharyi Region, Naungcho Township and Hsihseng Township in Shan State, and Taungngu Township in Bago Region, phone and internet connectivity became increasingly difficult or completely cut off. These events confirm that internet shutdowns are being employed as a form of weapon in the ongoing armed conflicts.
Communication Difficulties Caused by Infrastructure Damage
In addition to deliberate internet and phone line shutdowns, prolonged conflict has resulted in significant damage to basic infrastructure, severely impacting communication networks.
In Launglon Township, Tanintharyi Region, electricity outages lasted for over two weeks. This caused fuel shortages that rendered some generators inoperable. Similarly, in Naungmon Town, Kachin State, due to fuel difficulties, the only available communication line—MPT (Myanmar Posts and Telecommunications)—was only intermittently operational.
In Haka Town, Chin State, electricity has been cut for over three months, forcing residents to pay fees to charge their phones and other communication devices. Such weaknesses in essential infrastructure significantly hinder the public’s ability to access information and maintain communication.
Prolonged Communication Blackouts and Changes in Service Availability
As the military coup prolongs, the areas experiencing long-term communication blackouts have expanded.
In Myawaddy Town, Karen State, phone and internet lines have been cut for over a year, leaving local residents struggling to stay connected. In Rakhine State, which has nearly the entire region under internet blackout, even previously functional MEC (Myanmar Economic Corporation) phone lines have now been shut down. In Taunggyi City, Shan State, internet connections have notably slowed down, according to reports by The People’s Voice.
In Myitkyina City, Kachin State, where nearly all phone and internet lines are cut, the only available service is a Mytel phone line owned and operated by the Myanmar military.
Communication Restrictions Imposed by Local Public Administrative Bodies
In addition to internet shutdowns by the military council, local public administrative bodies in various regions have also begun restricting internet usage citing security concerns. For example, on June 17, the public administrative committee of Lauktu Township, Chin State, issued a statement imposing restrictions on the general public’s internet usage.
Arrests and Legal Actions Related to Online Expression
While the military council continues to impose communication shutdowns in some areas, in regions where internet access remains available, monthly surveillance and arrests targeting online speech and expression by the public are ongoing. In June 2025, approximately 28 people—including 18 men and 10 women—were arrested for their social media posts and online expressions.
Surveillance Measures Taken by the Military Council on the General Public
The military council continues to conduct surveillance and inspections aimed at suppressing opponents and disrupting support networks for the resistance movement.
Surveillance and Arrests Using the PSMS Digital System
According to reports, the military council has input a list of about 50,000 individuals—including political activists, Civil Disobedience Movement (CDM) participants, and armed resistance members—into the Person Scrutinization and Monitoring System (PSMS) software. This system is used to monitor and arrest people through checkpoints at inspection gates, airports, and city entry and exit points.
In Pinlon Township and Minegon Townships in Loikaw District, Southern Shan State, the PSMS software is reportedly used at checkpoints to screen travelers and carry out searches to arrest CDM staff and individuals charged under Article 505. This information was also reported by Shan State media outlet Shan Herald News Agency.
Targeting and Monitoring of Revolutionary Financial Flows
To disrupt the financial channels supporting the resistance, the military council has monitored bank accounts and online transactions, conducting intimidation and arrests.
The council has threatened that anyone involved in purchasing or distributing goods sold online by those participating in the revolution will face prosecution under the Counter-Terrorism Law.
Additionally, in Mandalay City, the military council has conducted searches and arrests of individuals whose bank accounts had previously been frozen.
On-the-Ground Direct Inspections and Arrests
In addition to high-tech surveillance tools like the PSMS software, sudden on-the-ground inspections and arrests have been carried out.
In Yangon, at bus terminals and crowded public places, members of the military council, dressed in plain clothes, have forcibly inspected civilians’ mobile phones and arrested young people, according to reports from the Narinjara news agency.
Summary of Digital Oppression Incidents Encountered
in July 2025
Mobile Phone and Internet Shutdowns
Arrests and Legal Actions Related to Online Expression
The Military Council’s Surveillance Measures on the General Public
Mobile Phone and Internet Shutdowns
In July 2025, significant internet and mobile phone communication shutdowns and restrictions continued to be clearly observed. The control over internet usage was notably stringent in areas under the influence of resistance forces, where internet access remained heavily restricted.
Situation of Internet Shutdowns by the Military Council
The Military Council has continued to impose communication network shutdowns citing military and security reasons.
After a bombing attack in Mogaung town, Mandalay Region, internet lines were cut off. Phone lines were also severed in villages within Dawei and Palaw townships in Tanintharyi Region where battles were ongoing. On July 19, during the martyr’s day ceremony attended by the military leader, phone and internet lines were temporarily cut off in Bahan and Sanchaung townships. In Thabeikkyin township, Mandalay Region, when fighting intensified again, both the Military Council and resistance forces cut off phone and internet lines, according to reports from DVB News Agency. Additionally, in Hakha town of Kachin State, the Military Council confiscated public-use Starlink Wi-Fi devices in an unlawful seizure.
Long-Term Internet Shutdowns in Conflict Areas
Civilians living in conflict-intensified regions continue to face prolonged communication blackouts.
In Sagaing Region’s Katha Township and nearly the entire Kachin State—including its capital, Myitkyina—the military council has enforced internet shutdowns for nearly one year. According to Mr. Jacob, a spokesperson for the Kachin Human Rights Watch (KHRW), such shutdowns have led to an increase in human rights violations. He stated that the internet blackouts obstruct the flow of information and contribute to increased incidents of arrests and airstrikes.
In Khampat town of Tamu, Sagaing Region, the military council partially reopened Ooredoo mobile lines in July after almost two years of shutdown. However, Wi-Fi internet lines and mobile networks such as MPT and Atom remain blocked.
Internet Control by Resistance Groups
In July 2025, the Arakan Army (AA) was notably seen taking control over internet services in Rakhine State. The AA regulated the use of Starlink internet access within the areas under its control and set a fixed usage rate of 2,000 MMK (Kyat) per hour. Due to this price setting by the AA, the cost of using Starlink internet in Rakhine State decreased compared to before, leading to an increase in the number of users. However, internet access remains available only in the northern townships of the state, while southern towns such as Gwa, Thandwe, and Toungup continue to be restricted from using the service.
Arrests and Legal Actions Related to Online Expression
In addition to communication blackouts, there have been continued surveillance and arrests targeting individuals for their public expressions online. In May 2025 alone, at least 16 people—12 men and 4 women—were reportedly arrested due to their posts or statements made on social media platforms.
The Military Council’s Surveillance Measures on the General Public
In July 2025, the military council intensified efforts to control the public through digital surveillance measures. These actions included upgrading the national registration smart card system (e-ID/UID), using the “Person Scrutinization and Monitoring System” (PSMS) application for arrest operations, and preparing to input personal data into the “National Service Information Management System” (NSIMS) for military conscription purposes.
Increased Preparation for Utilizing Digital Data Records
The military council announced on July 4 that it would temporarily suspend issuing smart ID cards, claiming it was to upgrade the e-ID system. Since seizing power, the military has been inputting data into the “National Service Information Management System” (NSIMS) to register young people who fall within the age bracket defined under their unilaterally imposed military conscription law. This effectively amounts to building a dedicated database aimed at controlling youth.
It has also been observed that the military council is putting significant effort into implementing the UID process to ensure the completeness of digital records. In July, they announced that strict actions would be taken against individuals who forge or possess counterfeit citizenship ID cards, household registration documents, or UID numbers.
Expansion of Technology-Based Surveillance Conditions
Due to arrests carried out through the military council’s PSMS application, a resident of Mingaladon Township in Yangon, Ma Thet Htar Thu Zar, was arrested this month at the joint checkpoint in Nant Pan Taik, Kalaw Township. This incident highlights that the military is now effectively utilizing the digital data they have collected from the public for surveillance purposes.
Frontier, one of Myanmar’s largest internet service providers—which has received at least USD 40 million in development funding from the UK, Norway, and Denmark—is reportedly using sophisticated Chinese surveillance technologies, according to Mizzima news agency. Furthermore, according to the Canada-based news site Biometric Update, Myanmar has signed a Memorandum of Understanding with India this month to support the implementation of an electronic digital ID system.
Both of these developments underscore a dramatic increase in technology-based surveillance in Myanmar. As part of this technological escalation, the military council also formed a National-Level Digital Economy Development Committee this month and announced the “Myanmar Digital Economy Roadmap 2030.”
Alarming Situation Concerning the Personal Data of Myanmar Nationals Living Abroad
As the military council’s domestic surveillance machinery continues to strengthen through digital technologies, a worrisome situation has emerged regarding the protection of personal data belonging to Myanmar nationals living abroad.
A coalition of 141 organizations has submitted a complaint to the headquarters of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), stating that the UNHCR office in India transferred confidential personal data of Myanmar refugees to the Indian government and called for accountability. The complaint emphasizes that Myanmar refugees, who are not adequately protected, have had their sensitive personal data handed over by the UNHCR office in India—an act that the complainants describe as irresponsible.
Escalation of Repressive Legal Measures
On July 30, 2025, the military council signed into effect the Cybersecurity Law, which was originally drafted on January 1, 2025. Under this law, digital platform service providers with more than 100,000 domestic users are required to retain users’ personal data and usage records for up to three years. The authorities can demand access to this data at their discretion.
The law also grants the military council the authority to temporarily block or permanently shut down electronic information or digital platform services, and to temporarily seize any related equipment or assets.
Moreover, VPN service providers operating under this law are required to store users’ personal data and usage records. Those who establish VPN services without permission may face prison sentences, as specified in newly enacted provisions.
Recommended Citation Style –
Myanmar Internet Project (2025, Aug). Myanmar Digital Coup Quarterly: May 2025 - July 2025.
EngageMedia is publishing English translations of the Myanmar Digital Coup Quarterly produced by the Myanmar Internet Project. This post covers updates between May 2025 to July 2025 and highlights digital oppression incidents documented during that period. Read the original post in Burmese here, and learn more about EngageMedia’s broader work to support digital rights in Myanmar on EngageMedia.org/Myanmar.
Read the other editions of the report.