Myanmar Digital Coup Quarterly: May 2026 - July 2026
- Myanmar Internet Project
- 6 hours ago
- 10 min read
Five and a half years on from the 2021 coup, Myanmar’s junta continues to monitor and suppress the digital rights of its citizens and military personnel. Freedom of expression and media freedom remain severely restricted.
There have also been moves to limit internet usage and impose levies in areas where revolutionary forces have influence, as well as in regions controlled by ethnic armed groups.
This report records digital suppression incidents that occurred between May and July 2026.
1. Summary of Digital Repression Incidents in May 2026
1.1 Mobile Phone and Internet Shutdowns
1.2 Arrests and Legal Actions Related to Online Expression
1.3 The Military Council’s Surveillance Measures on the General Public
1.4 Press Freedom Under Threat
1.1 Mobile Phone and Internet Shutdowns
In areas where conflicts have escalated, revolutionary forces temporarily restricted or suspended Starlink satellite internet usage due to air raid threats. Revolutionary forces have also reportedly banned travellers visiting regions under its control from using Starlink.
Such internet outages have meant that many people living in these areas were not receiving timely, life-saving warnings about air raids. Some villagers were also subjected to sexual violence while telecommunications were down.
(a) Starlink Internet Bans
In Sagaing Region—specifically the townships of Indaw, Kani, Tabayin, Ye-U, and Taze— local administration bodies, as well as the People’s Defense Force (PDF), temporarily suspended access to Starlink due to concerns about the risk of airstrikes and ongoing military operations.
On May 22, in the Shwebo District, Starlink terminals that had been temporarily shut down were allowed to resume use by the No. (1) Shwebo District Military Command. The people’s administration body in Saw Township also banned local visitors from using Starlink internet. In addition, the people’s administration body in Tabayin Township no longer permitted the sale of billing cards that would allow local visitors to use Starlink internet.
In Rakhine State, according to a report by Western News, Starlink devices that had been officially registered and purchased by relevant authorities were being seized by the ULA/AA (Arakan Army) technical department without any stated justification. Starlink's parent company SpaceX also required existing users to submit passport details to re-register their Starlink terminals.
(b) Other Observed Communication Disruptions
In Sagaing Region, in Budalin Township, mobile phone lines became more disrupted, and in southern Shan State, in Taunggyi, noticeable slowdowns occurred in both phone and internet connections. In Yangon Region, after the military-appointed Yangon Region Chief Minister said that communication cables would be changed to an underground connection system, fiber-optic internet cables that had been run on utility poles were cut and cleared away. As a result, there were internet outages in some townships.
In Katha Township, Sagaing Region, the Atom mobile phone network resumed service in May 2026.
(c) Impact of Communication Disruptions
Due to communication blackouts, many people were not warned about disasters, violent attacks and military strikes.
While phone lines were down in Mayoegone Village, Myingyan Township, Mandalay Region, Pyu Saw Htee groups entering the area committed heinous crimes, including the rape of four women. In Mawdaung Town, Tanintharyi Region, due to phone and internet lines being cut by revolutionary forces, locals faced difficulties in receiving timely early warnings about airstrikes.
1.2 Arrests and Legal Actions Related to Online Expression
In May 2026, the military continued to make arrests and prosecutions related to online expression.
General Ye Win Oo, who has taken over as the new Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, stated that "social media is a toxic thing." The statement could hint at further restrictions and greater online surveillance.
Dr. Kaung San, who posted a video on social media criticizing the military and police for failing to arrest those responsible for his wife's death, was arrested at his house in Yazathingyan Ward, Dala Township, Yangon Region.
1.3 The Military Council’s Surveillance Measures on the General Public
In May 2026, the coup military junta made preparations to monitor not only citizens at home and abroad, but also civil servants under its command.
(a) Surveillance and Tracking Using Technology
The military junta has begun registering the MAC addresses of phones and computers used by civil servants in Naypyitaw to monitor and take action against any leaks of information. The junta also sent SMS messages to citizens warning that anyone caught contacting the Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw (CRPH), National Unity Government (NUG), or People's Defense Force (PDF) would be prosecuted under the Anti-Terrorism Law.
(b) Increased Surveillance of Overseas Citizens
The Myanmar embassy in Thailand has imposed restrictions, refusing to issue passports and other documents not only to civil servants who participated in the Civil Disobedience Movement (CDM) but also to their family members. Those renewing their passports are now subjected to more stringent checks than before.
1.4 Press Freedom Under Threat
Media in Myanmar remains heavily censored, and its journalists face frequent threats of violence and arrests. The military regime continues to shut down news outlets while steadily expanding its media collaboration with China.
(a) Shutdowns of News Outlets, Arrests, and Threats Against Journalists
The military junta announced the forced closure of three news organizations: Myaelatt Athan, Red News Agency, and Asia Citizens. Meanwhile, the Independent Press Council Myanmar (IPCM) reported that 18 journalists—including three women—remain behind bars. Ma Khin Tharaphi Oo, a reporter for Than Lwin Khet News based in Rakhine (Arakan) State, faced online sexual violence and physical safety threats from a Facebook user operating under the account name “Twan Lynn Thein.”
The Independent Investigative Mechanism for Myanmar (IIMM) reiterated that Myanmar remains one of the world's most dangerous countries for media workers. The Press Emblem Campaign (PEC) highlighted ongoing press freedom violations across the nation. A joint report in March by Human Rights Myanmar and IPCM pointed out a total lack of regulatory mechanisms for harmful content shared on social media platforms during the regime's sham election period.
(b) Expanding China-Myanmar Media Cooperation
While the junta stifles independent press in Myanmar, its collaboration with China's state-run media continues to expand. During the China-Myanmar Media Dialogue for Q2 2026 held at the Chinese Embassy, agreements were reached with Beijing to broaden Myanmar-China content coverage on state-run broadcasting networks.
2. Summary of Digital Repression Incidents in June 2026
2.1 Mobile Phone and Internet Shutdowns
2.2 Arrests and Legal Actions Related to Online Expression
2.3 The Military Council’s Surveillance Measures on the General Public
2.4 Press Freedom Under Threat
2.1 Mobile Phone and Internet Shutdowns
In June 2026, local authorities in areas controlled by the National Unity Government (NUG) and the Arakan Army (ULA/AA) began imposing taxes on Starlink satellite internet usage. At the same time, phone users faced widespread network access issues due to the junta’s implementation of the CEIR (Central Equipment Identity Register) system, which blocked unrecognized SIM cards and devices.
(a) Starlink Internet Taxation and Regional Developments
Following the military coup, the regime's deliberate blackouts and destruction of infrastructure turned Starlink satellite internet into a vital lifeline for information flows in affected regions. However, this month saw local authorities in several areas introduce increased taxes and profit-sharing schemes on Starlink usage.
In Sagaing Region’s Kani Township, the National Unity Government (NUG) began levying up to 1 million MMK (around 226 USD) in annual taxes on Starlink internet shops. This tax burden has driven up internet costs for users by more than double, creating a significant barrier to information access for communities living in conflict zones.
Meanwhile, in Rakhine State, the Arakan Army (AA) officially authorized Public Internet Access Centers (PIAC) under a (30%–70%) profit-sharing arrangement with private operators. Due to a shortage of operational PIAC locations in Buthidaung Township, local residents have urged the United League of Arakan (ULA) administration to expand service coverage.
(b) Other Observed Communication Disruptions
In Dawei Township, Tanintharyi Region, numerous residents had their mobile phones rendered unusable under the Central Equipment Identity Register (CEIR) system when they did not pay the imposed taxes. Meanwhile, in Shwegu Township, Kachin State—where active military tensions persist alongside daily junta airstrikes—cellular and telecommunication lines remain completely cut.
(c) Impact of Communication Disruptions
Prolonged phone and internet blackouts in Rakhine State have robbed local youth of vital education and employment opportunities, according to a recent survey released by the Youth-Led Organization (YLO).
2.2 Arrests and Legal Actions Related to Online Expression
Regime surveillance and punitive measures against online expression remain undiminished. According to disclosures from the junta-controlled Ministry of Home Affairs, social networks are subject to continuous monitoring.
(a) Ministry Disclosures Concerning Online Surveillance
The Ministry of Home Affairs formally stated that it conducts 24-hour monitoring of social media for "disinformation, misinformation, and politically hostile rhetoric." Official statements reveal that over 20,000 people have been detained and charged with incitement of terrorism over the preceding three years.
This statement effectively serves as an explicit acknowledgment of the grave conditions surrounding online freedom of expression for the Myanmar public.
(b) Penalties and Legal Actions Involving Online Discourse
A female resident of Ayetharyar (Taunggyi Township, Shan State) was taken into custody after posting a TikTok video commemorating State Counsellor Daw Aung San Suu Kyi's 81st birthday. Meanwhile, a lunch-box vendor incarcerated for authoring satirical posts against the junta leader was handed a supplementary 10-year prison sentence, bringing his cumulative sentence to 13 years.
The military regime also detained an American entrepreneur who authored a book about the coup. At least five individuals were arrested this month alone in connection with their online posts and activity.
2.3 The Military Council’s Surveillance Measures on the General Public
Documentation by the Myanmar Internet Project reveals that the military junta expanded its surveillance coverage in June 2026, deploying systems such as PSMS and GLIS to monitor public movement.
(b) Technological Surveillance Measures
The regime enforced strict compliance requiring all hotels and lodgings to utilize the Guest List Information System (GLIS).
Concurrently, screening via the Public Security Management System (PSMS) was tightened at transit hubs and checkpoints. Utilizing PSMS data, security forces apprehended Civil Disobedience Movement (CDM) participants at Yangon Airport and detained a male traveler at Tachileik Airport in eastern Shan State. In Kangyidaunt Township (Ayeyarwady Region), PSMS verifications were conducted alongside routine checks on unlicensed motor vehicles.
Junta police reports indicate that tech-assisted inspections at checkpoints and guest registration checks led to the arrest of 746 individuals during the initial two months of Min Aung Hlaing's administrative term following the sham elections.
Justice For Myanmar, Mekong Watch, and five Japanese CSOs issued a joint call demanding that KDDI Corporation and Sumitomo Corporation divest from state-owned Myanmar Posts and Telecommunications (MPT), due to its involvement in digital surveillance and censorship.
(b) Structural Expansion of Surveillance Capabilities
On June 10, state media revealed that the "e-Government Steering Committee" and "National Database System Implementation Steering Committee" were established on April 21 to synchronize inter-ministerial data for e-ID and e-Government initiatives. The completion of these projects will centralize citizen records under unified control, streamlining mass tracking.
Additionally, an analysis by the ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute in Singapore noted that the junta is exploiting anti-money laundering and counter-terrorism financing frameworks to dismantle non-governmental organizations (NGOs/CSOs) and political opposition groups.
2.4 Press Freedom Under Threat
A joint study released by the Independent Press Council Myanmar (IPCM) and Human Rights Myanmar (HRM) reveals that public access to independent media has plummeted by 48%. The report attributes this steep decline to continuous internet shutdowns, digital monitoring, and rising subscription fees—highlighting the efficacy of digital repression as a tool for information control.
3. Summary of Digital Repression Incidents in July 2026
3.1 Mobile Phone and Internet Shutdowns
3.2 Arrests and Legal Actions Related to Online Expression
3.3 The Military Council’s Surveillance Measures on the General Public
3.1 Mobile Phone and Internet Shutdowns
July 2026 marked a major disruption in connectivity as widespread deactivations of Starlink internet terminals occurred due to territorial policy enforcement. The military regime also intentionally severed cellular service during Martyrs' Day on July 19 and persisted in imposing communication blackouts alongside aerial bombing campaigns.
(a) Starlink Service Disruptions and Operational Impact
Essential to maintaining connectivity in conflict settings, numerous Starlink devices went offline in compliance with the provider’s geofencing regulations. Affected areas included Karenni State, Rakhine State, and Sagaing Region. A joint declaration signed by over 300 civil society organizations highlighted that the deactivations have inflicted severe damage on humanitarian assistance efforts serving vulnerable populations.
(b) Regime-Enforced Weaponization of Telecom Cutoffs
The junta maintains its strategy of leveraging telecom shutdowns as an operational tool during strategic military maneuvers and significant public dates.
Cellular lines were disabled across multiple Yangon townships during the July 19 Martyrs' Day ceremonies. In Thayet Kaung Pin Village (Mahlaing Township, Mandalay Region), telecommunication access was disrupted prior to air raids. Mobile and internet connectivity was likewise blocked in Yebyu Township (Tanintharyi Region) during ground operations by junta troops. Persistent disruptions to MPT cellular networks were also reported in the high-tension Popa area of Kyaukpadaung Township, Mandalay region..
Kachin State has endured a comprehensive, state-wide communication shutdown spanning nearly two years. News sources indicate that partial Mytel network coverage was restored this month in select townships, including Monghnyin, Mogaung, Myitkyina, and Waimaw. The Kachin Human Rights Watch (KHRW) continues to advocate for the complete reinstatement of telecom infrastructure.
In Rakhine State, prolonged blackouts paired with increased blockades on digital financial tools—such as KBZ Pay and KBZ Special Accounts—have escalated remittance fees to extortionate rates of 8%.
3.2 Arrests and Legal Actions Related to Online Expression
The military regime persists in apprehending and silencing citizens over digital commentary critical of the junta or interpreted as indirect backing for the State Counsellor.
Separately, law enforcement initiated legal proceedings under Section 66(d) of the Telecommunications Law to track down the owner of the "Paoh News-2" account following a disclosure detailing bribery by the Shan State Police Chief. Minimum estimates indicate that at least five individuals were detained over online expression during the reporting period.
3.3 The Military Council’s Surveillance Measures on the General Public
Documented incidents demonstrate the ongoing expansion of the military regime’s mass surveillance apparatus targeting civilian mobility.
In Loikaw Township, Karenni State, a Catholic nun assisting internally displaced persons (IDPs) was detained and indicted under Section 505A after military inspectors discovered financial donation records on her mobile phone. This incident reflects a broader pattern of arbitrary device inspections aimed at criminalizing humanitarian aid. In Sittwe, Rakhine State, phone searches and subsequent detentions have also increased, with local residents suspecting these checks are informed by wiretapping and signal interception.
The regime has expanded the deployment of the Public Security Management System (PSMS)—formerly restricted to transit hubs and roadway checkpoints—to inspect express train commuters. Disclosures from the Ministry of Home Affairs confirm that high-level checkpoints are utilizing integrated verification routines combining PSMS database queries, AI facial recognition, biometric data matching, and National Identity Card validation. These findings align with an analytical report by the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED), which highlights rising digital surveillance and targeted arrests in urban environments.
Citing anti-money laundering and anti-scam (Kyat-Phant) enforcement, the junta froze hundreds of commercial bank accounts. Drafted on May 14 and formally passed this month, the Anti-Online Scam Law (2026) includes Section 21(a), which obligates financial institutions to execute immediate transaction freezes upon government request. Evaluated alongside recent account freezes, this statute creates a regulatory blanket allowing authorities to monitor financial flows unrelated to cybercrime under the guise of legal compliance. Furthermore, Section 17 requires telecom operators to archive subscriber location data and call detail records for state access, heightening fears that mobile networks will be coerced into conducting targeted location tracking.
In addition, the regime has instituted a strict rule compelling inbound international air travelers to register their mobile handsets with the Central Equipment Identity Register (CEIR) within a 30-day window.
Recommended Citation Style - Myanmar Internet Project (2026, August 12),
Myanmar Digital Coup Quarterly: May 2026 - July 2026,
EngageMedia is publishing English translations of the Myanmar Digital Coup Quarterly produced by the Myanmar Internet Project. This post covers updates between May 2026 to July 2026 and highlights digital oppression incidents documented during that period. Read the original post in Burmese here, and learn more about EngageMedia’s broader work to support digital rights in Myanmar on EngageMedia.org/Myanmar.
Read the other editions of the report.
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