Myanmar Digital Coup Quarterly: February 2026 - April 2026

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The period from February to April 2026 marks the first three months following the fifth anniversary of the coup. It is also the period when the sham parliament, resulting from the coup military junta's fake election, begins its sessions.

The junta continues to enact new laws to justify further online surveillance, internet shutdowns and other forms of digital repression. Some clauses within these newly enacted laws were designed to allow for greater access to the public's digital footprint.

This report documents incidents of digital repression  between February and  April 2026.

1. Summary of Digital Repression Incidents in February 2026

1.1 Mobile Phone and Internet Shutdowns

1.2 Arrests and Legal Actions Related to Online Expression

1.3 The Military Council’s Surveillance Measures on the General Public

1.1 Mobile Phone and Internet Shutdowns

In February 2026, in addition to the junta's communication blackouts, there were also telecommunication restrictions by revolutionary forces.

(a) Communication Blackouts by the Military Junta

The military junta carried out phone line and internet blackouts to guard  the flow of information during military operations and to protect the whereabouts of their leaders.

Phone lines were cut during a military operation in the eastern part of Wetlet Town, Sagaing Region,  which displaced nearly 10,000 villagers. When a  military leader visited  Pyin Oo Lwin, Mandalay Region, for the opening of the Yadanabon Cyber City project and a shopping center, phone and internet lines were cut under the pretext of security. After clashes broke out in villages north of Ywangan Town, Shan State, the junta imposed a digital curfew after 8PM, among other restrictions.  

(b) Communication Control by Revolutionary Forces

Revolutionary forces and ethnic armed organizations (EAOs) also implemented communication restrictions for military purposes, as well as some communication blackouts.

The Arakan Army (AA) announced that they would accept applications for leasing Starlink devices and would return confiscated privately-owned Starlink devices. In the Daai region of Kanpetlet Township, Chin State, the Chin Defense Force (Daai) reportedly cut off the public use of Starlink internet lines and forcibly conducted conscription, according to the Irrawaddy news agency. A group under KNLA Battalion 12 also destroyed a phone tower in Min Dat Village, Tanintharyi Region.

Communication blackouts delay public access to information in conflict zones and can hinder job or educational opportunities. In the Rakhine region, young people lost opportunities to apply for a nursing course opened by the AA due to a lack of local ID card and difficulties with phone lines.

1.2 Arrests and Legal Actions Related to Online Expression 

The junta continued to arrest and sentence citizens  for  expressing their opinions on social media platforms. Even junta loyalists faced severe penalties, including prison sentences, if their statements contains terms displeasing to the junta.

Zaw Bone Hein, a junta loyalist who was arrested for online statements, received an additional two-year prison sentence from a military court under Section 66(d) of the Telecommunications Law. Two men from Mandalay Region and Bago Region were also arrested this month for their statements and posts on social media.

1.3 The Military Council’s Surveillance Measures on the General Public

The junta's surveillance process targeting the public continues to be strictly enforced, utilizing both digital technology and legal amendments.

The junta has further amended the Law Protecting the Privacy and Security of the Citizen. It has been found that this amendment was not aimed at protecting citizens' liberty and security, but rather at facilitating the surveillance of digital usage.

The People's Spring news agency reports that those who have had their bank accounts closed are being systematically checked using the Person Scrutinization and Monitoring System  (PSMS), leading to ongoing arrests. Additionally, the Central Bank, which operates under the junta's State Administration Council, is pressuring businesses to reduce cash usage and adopt digital payment systems. As the use of cash decreases  and the adoption of digital currency becomes more widespread, it will become easier to monitor financial flows.

2. Summary of Digital Repression Incidents in March 2026

2.1 Mobile Phone and Internet Shutdowns

2.2 Arrests and Legal Actions Related to Online Expression

2.3 The Military Council’s Surveillance Measures on the General Public

2.4 Press Freedom Under Threat

2.1 Mobile Phone and Internet Shutdowns

During March 2026, in addition to the junta's communication blackouts, revolutionary organizations  also placed restrictions on telecommunications. Furthermore, in areas experiencing communication blackouts, airstrikes causing mass casualties were recorded, as well as situations where humanitarian aid could not reach those in need due to communication disruptions.

(a) The junta's Communication Blackouts and Military Attacks

In areas where communication lines were cut, the junta was conducting intense military operations and airstrikes. In Katha, where fighting between revolutionary forces and junta troops was severe, only one MEC phone line was usable, while other telecommunication lines were down. During this communication blackout, a monastery sheltering displaced civilians was bombed on March 21st, which killed  over 60 civilians. The junta also launched an airstrike on a quarry in the Mawchi area of Hpasawng Township, Karenni (Kayah) State, cutting  phone and internet connections. .

In Ayeyarwady Region, townships such as Yegyi, Lemyethna, Chaungtha, Thabaung, and Kyangin were also frequently experiencing internet and phone line disruptions due to fighting. Mytel phone lines have gone down in Shan State, Momeik, which is also experiencing  fuel shortages..

In Thayetchaung Township, Tanintharyi Region, nearly 10,000 displaced people are struggling to receive aid due to roadblocks and phone line blackouts. Cut off from phone lines and internet connectivity, civilians in conflict zones are unable to receive early warnings or avoid life-threatening situations such as airstrikes, and have difficulties accessing humanitarian assistance. 

(b) Communication Control by Revolutionary Forces

Revolutionary forces also imposed communication restrictions in areas under their control.

In areas controlled by the Arakan Army (AA), privately owned Starlink devices are subject to restrictions requiring owners to pay taxes to the AA. On the other hand, the AA has also been providing Starlink services in areas under its control on a rotating basis. According to DVB news, the cost for using these internet services is approximately 10,000 kyats ($USD 2.35) per hour. In villages in Rathedaung Township, Rakhine State, the AA has restricted each village to using only one MEC phone line (one phone per village). Nearly the entire Rakhine State was experiencing phone and internet blackouts, with only some MEC SIM card lines working in certain locations.

In Thayetchaung Township, Tanintharyi Region, the KNU has strictly prohibited locals from using phones, citing security reasons. Meanwhile, in urban areas of Bawlakhe Town in Karenni (Kayah) State, the use of MPT and CDMA phone lines has reportedly been permitted again.

2.2 Arrests and Legal Actions Related to Online Expression

The junta continues to carry out surveillance and arrests regarding the public's online access. According to a report by the CJ Platform published on March 27, during the pre-election and election period of the sham election, from September 2025 to January 2026, six military propaganda Telegram channels posted 67 messages inciting threats and arrests. This is clear evidence of public surveillance through pro-junta online accounts.

U Kyi, a food vendor who was arrested in January for criticizing junta leader Min Aung Hlaing, was sentenced by the Insein Prison Court to three years of hard labor. Furthermore, three men from Magway Region, Bago Region, and Shan State were arrested this month for statements and posts made on social media.

2.3 The Military Council’s Surveillance Measures on the General Public

In March 2026, the State Administration Council (the junta) was observed implementing IMEI registration systems and introducing provisions into the Anti-Money Laundering Law that allow for the interception of communication systems, in order to increase control over public communications.

(a) Surveillance and Tracking Using Technology

The junta announced that starting from April 1, 2026, it would block mobile phones that had not paid taxes by disabling their IMEI numbers. Furthermore, AAJM news agency reported that arrests were being made by tracking the IMEI numbers. It was also observed that on March 25, an announcement was made allowing non-standard phones (clone handsets) to continue being used for only three more years. On March 28, the CJ Platform revealed records of the junta requesting operators to provide the locations, call logs, and user profiles of SIM card users, along with the phone numbers involved.

Additionally, instructions have been issued to revise the watchlists for the PSMS system, and in Sittwe, Rakhine State, solar-powered CCTV cameras have been installed to monitor the public.

Under the newly-enacted Myanmar Passport Law this month, passport applicants are now required to submit their UID numbers. Since UID numbers are linked to the holder's biometric data, integrating the passport system with UID will make it easy to track where a passport holder is located in any country.

It is believed that under this legal provision, passports will soon be converted to an e-passport system. The advantage of the e-passport system is not only that those conducting surveillance can easily know which countries a person has traveled through, but also that e-passports are easier to cancel than the current old-system passports.

(b) Efforts to Further Legitimize Interception Under the Law

It has been observed that in the newly enacted Anti-Money Laundering Law, Chapter 5, under Section 12 concerning the duties and powers of the Ministry of Home Affairs, provisions have been included to permit  access to networks as well as  intercepting or cutting communication lines. These provisions grant the Ministry of Home Affairs extensive powers. In other words, these provisions are intended to enable joint surveillance of financial transactions and communications.

2.4 Press Freedom Under Threat

During March 2026,  there were preparations for new junta propaganda mechanisms, evidence of control over press freedom, and the detention of journalists by some revolutionary forces.

The junta has been organizing an "Information Sheet" publication team that will publish in four languages - Burmese, English, Russian, and Chinese - to respond in real-time to news perceived as critical of the junta.

According to  a report by the Independent Press Council of Myanmar (IPCM) and Human Rights in Myanmar, during the sham election period, the junta blocked access to 93% of independent media websites. 

In Hpakan, Kachin State, there was also an incident where Ko Tar Lin Maung, editor of Uru Daily News, was arrested and taken away by the KIA/KPDF group for one day. This incident highlights the security concerns faced by journalists operating in conflict zones.

3. Summary of Digital Repression Incidents in April 2026

3.1 Mobile Phone and Internet Shutdowns

3.2 Arrests and Legal Actions Related to Online Expression

3.3 The Military Council’s Surveillance Measures on the General Public

3.4 Press Freedom Under Threat

3.1 Mobile Phone and Internet Shutdowns

In  April 2026, communication blackouts had socioeconomic impacts in vulnerable communities , and there were reports of restrictions to the use of Starlink internet.

Military operations and targeted internet blackouts

During airstrikes conducted by the junta in Bilin Township, Mon State, phone towers were deliberately targeted and communication lines cut. During military operations in villages northeast of Myingyan, Mandalay Region, phone and internet lines were also cut.

Such communication blackouts, intended to obstruct the flow of information during military conflicts, undermine the ability of local populations to take early preventative measures against dangers and increase the risk of life-threatening situations.

(a) Other Observed Communication Blackouts

In Thein Kone Village, Ywangan Township, southern Shan State, along with irregular electricity supply, Mytel and MPT phone lines have experienced further disruptions. In Taunggyi, the capital of Shan State, following the Thingyan period, increased electricity blackouts have  impeded phone and internet use.. In Nyaung Shwe Township, southern Shan State, damage to backup power systems (solar and batteries) installed on a communication tower in the Pindaya region's Naung Bo village has caused severe communication delays in that area. In Pindaya Town itself, ATOM phone lines have been disrupted for extended periods, forcing ATOM users to switch to other operators. The inability to provide adequate electricity - a basic necessity - has led to subsequent disruptions in communication, another essential need.

(b) Impact of Communication Blackouts

The obstruction of information during blackouts have had devastating  consequences. In Sin Htoe Gyi village, Palaw Township, Tanintharyi Region, news of a fire could not be sent in time due to phone line disruptions, resulting in the loss of many homes. In the lower part of Thayetchaung Township, Tanintharyi Region, roadblocks and communication blackouts led to food shortages. In the Rakhine region, the Arakan Study Center (CAS) stated that emergency relief efforts were  delayed due to internet difficulties.

3.2 Arrests and Legal Actions Related to Online Expression 

In April 2026, the junta continued to surveil and repress  online expression .

A pro-junta individual named Ngar Min Swe was arrested at his home in Hpa Ka Leik village, Kyaikto Township, Mon State, by police forces under the junta. A vendor named Mari Mari was arrested at the Thaketa Police Station in Yangon for selling books on TikTok, including "The Generals Lied to Me," written by author U Tin Nyunt before the coup. Author U Tin Nyunt, a recipient of the National Literature Award, has been charged under Section 505(a) for damaging state harmony for publishing content critical of the military, and his son (the publisher) has also been arrested.

From the above incidents, it can be observed that the junta continues to monitor social media and arrest those who criticize them. In other words, the junta—which seeks to transform itself into a nominal democratic government through a sham election—continues to suppress freedom of expression, a fundamental right enshrined in Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and Article 19(a) of the ICCPR.

3.3 The Military Council’s Surveillance Measures on the General Public

In April 2026, the junta increased its efforts to tighten passenger screening at airports and to monitor the personal data and movements of citizens through the use of digital technology.

(a) Increased Scrutiny of Travel

The junta issued an announcement requiring domestic and international passengers to present their national ID documents at airports. Subsequently, the use of the PSMS (Personnel Security Monitoring System) to check passenger data at airports has been intensified compared to previous periods.

(b) Surveillance and Tracking Using Technology

According to news reports, the junta used the PSMS system to screen individuals planning to meet with President U Win Myint, who was released under an amnesty from the coup junta's detention. Furthermore, this month marks the implementation  of a junta initiative that links the IMEI numbers of mobile phones with SIM card registrations, enabling the surveillance and tracking of mobile phone users.

3.4 Press Freedom Under Threat

In April 2026, press freedom continued to be suppressed, with licenses of several news outlets being revoked. Resistance movements have also campaigned for the release of arrested journalists.

The junta revoked the media licenses of three domestic news agencies: Chin World, Nowsadays-news, and Khonuthung Media. This is clear evidence of efforts to restrict the free flow of information. According to the World Press Freedom Index published by Reporters Without Borders (RSF) on April 30, 2026, Myanmar ranks 166th out of 180 countries for press freedom..

Such censorship  limits the right of everyone to freely receive and share information, as stated in Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Article 25(a) of the ICCPR states: "Every citizen shall have the right and the opportunity to take part in the conduct of public affairs, directly or through freely chosen representatives." Restrictions on information reduce the public’s ability to participate in and make decisions regarding civilian affairs. In other words, this indirectly violates Article 25(a) of the ICCPR.

While media suppression persists, there are also movements advocating for the release of detained journalists. Protests were held in front of the Myanmar embassy in Bangkok, Thailand, demanding the release of detained journalist Ko Sai Zaw Thike. The Independent Myanmar Journalists Association (IMJA) also issued a statement calling for the unconditional release of all detained journalists.

Recommended Citation Style - Myanmar Internet Project (2026, May 23),

Myanmar Digital Coup Quarterly: February 2026 - April 2026 Myanmar, https://www.myanmarinternet.info/post/quarterly_feb_apr_2026

EngageMedia is publishing English translations of the Myanmar Digital Coup Quarterly produced by the Myanmar Internet Project. This post covers updates between November 2025 to January 2026 and highlights digital oppression incidents documented during that period. Read the original post in Burmese here, and learn more about EngageMedia’s broader work to support digital rights in Myanmar on EngageMedia.org/Myanmar.

Read the other editions of the report.